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vSUMMARY
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was formed in 1994 after the
integration of different “defence forces” into one large force. The sole existence of the
SANDF is to protect the borders of the Republic of South Africa and its inhabitants.
Resources such as vehicles make it easier for the SANDF to conduct mobile patrols
and other operations to ensure that the organisation is always combat-ready.
Motor vehicle theft is a crime that affects both individual citizens and organisations in
South Africa; the SANDF is not immune to the crime. Many SANDF motor vehicles are
stolen almost every day, and in most cases, these vehicles are taken without a trace.
While there are security measures in place aimed at preventing theft of SANDF
vehicles but these methods have proven futile.
A literature review formed the basis of the study. Once the main theory and ideologies
were identified, unstructured interviews were undertaken to gather information from
various stakeholders. Observations were also conducted to determine behavioural
patterns within military bases/units with regard to the parking of SANDF vehicles, even
when the vehicles were parked in urban settings. Essentially, there is a problem
regarding the security of SANDF vehicles and also the security within military bases /
units. This study indicated that the SANDF loses vast amounts of money due to motor
vehicle theft in Gauteng Province. The findings also revealed that the current vehicle
security measures are outdated, ineffective and inadequate in preventing SANDF
vehicles from being stolen.
The recommendations are that the SANDF must invest more of its budget on vehicle
security, rather than continuing with fruitless and monetary expenditure by conducting
Board of Inquiries (BOI) or lengthy investigations in an attempt to relocate stolen
vehicles or to determine how a particular vehicle was stolen. The SANDF requires a
comprehensive system that should prevent the theft of its vehicles, as well as curbing
the misuse of vehicles which ultimately renders SANDF vehicles as easy targets.
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OPSOMMING
Die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) is in 1994 gestig volgens die
integrasie van verskillende "weermagte" in een groot krag. Die enigste bestaan van die
SANW is om die grense van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika en sy inwoners te beskerm.
Daarom is hulpbronne soos voertuie noodsaaklike om dit makliker te maak vir die
SANW om mobiele patrollies en ander bedrywighede uit te voer om te verseker dat die
organisasie bestry gereed te alle tye.
Motordiefstal is 'n misdaad wat 'n invloed op individuele burgers en organisasies
onderskeidelik in Suid-Afrika het; die SANW is nie immuun teen die misdaad nie.
SANW motorvoertuie word gesteel byna elke dag en in die meeste gevalle, is die
vortuie nooit weer gevind nie. Ten spyte van die sekuriteitsmaatreëls wat in plek gestel
is, en wat gemik is op die voorkoming van diefstal van voertuie in die SANW is hierdie
maatreëls alreeds bewys as nutteloos.
Vir die basis van die studie, is 'n literatuuroorsig gebruik. Ongestruktureerde
onderhoude is gebruik om inligting in te samel van verskeie belanghebbendes.
Waarnemings is ook gedoen om gedragspatrone binne militêre basisse / eenhede
(insluitend terwyl geparkeer in die dorp) te bepaal met betrekking tot die parkering van
voertuie SANW. Die feit is dat daar 'n probleem is met betrekking tot die veiligheid van
die SANW voertuie en ook die sekuriteit in militêre basisse / eenhede. Die studie het
aangedui dat die SANW honderde duisende rande verloor deur diefstal van
motorvoertuie in die Gauteng Provinsie. Die bevindinge het ook onthul dat die huidige
voertuig sekuriteit maatreëls ondoeltreffend en ontoereikend is in die voorkoming van
SANW voertuie wat gesteel word.
Die SANW moet meer belê op voertuig sekuriteit, eerder om meer geld en tyd
afteneem vir Raad navrae (BOI) of lang ondersoeke om te probeer om gesteelde
voertuie op te spoor of om te bepaal hoe 'n spesifieke voertuig gesteel. Die SANW
vereis 'n omvattende stelsel wat in staat sal wees om die diefstal van die voertuie te
voorkom en ook om die misbruik van voertuie te verminder.
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KEY CONCEPTS
 Modus operandi
 Theft
 Motor vehicle theft
 Robbery
 Hijacking
 Stabling authority
 Trip authority
 Military Police Official
ACRONYMS
AU - African Union
BOI - Board of Inquiry
CBD - Central Business District
DI - Defence Intelligence
DOD - Department of Defence
LWT - Light Weight Troop
MP - Military Police
MPD - Military Police Division
SAAF - South African Air Force
SADC - South African Development Community
SAHMS - South African Military Health Services
SANDF - South African National Defence Force
SAPS - South African Police Services
UN - United Nations
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1CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The South African Police Service (SAPS) 2008/2009 Annual Report revealed
that 86579 motor vehicles were stolen in South Africa of which 68476 were by
means of theft and 18103 were by means of robbery. Out of the whole total
number of stolen vehicles in South Africa, Gauteng Province contributes
44434 of these numbers, which represents the highest number of motor
vehicles and motorcycles being stolen in one province during the 2008/2009
financial year.
The South African National Defence Force (reported to the Military Police)
reported 29 motor vehicles that were stolen were 29 in the 2008/2009
financial year according to the South African Police Service Annual Report
(2008/2009:77), 28 of these motor vehicles were stolen through theft and only
one was stolen by means of robbery. The researcher has noticed that the
South African Police Service (SAPS) statistics do not provide statistics per
regarding stolen vehicles per province.
The SAPS Crime Report for 2010/2011 financial year released by the Minister
of Police Mr. Nathi Mthethwa, on 9 September 2011 presented a decrease
regarding the number of serious crimes by 2, 4 percent when compared to the
2009/2010 financial year. Serious crimes included property crime (crime
against the person); contact-related crime; other crime and crime detected as
a result of police action (SAPS Crime Report 2010/2011:1).
The 2010/2011 SAPS Crime report exhibited a significant decrease in motor
vehicle and motorcycle theft. In 2009/2010 financial year 71776 motor
vehicles and motorcycles were stolen in South Africa, compared to the 64504
motor vehicles and motorcycles that were stolen in South Africa in the
2010/2011 financial year. In 2009/2010 financial year, only 345 motor vehicles
and motorcycles were stolen in Gauteng when compared to the 2884 vehicles
stolen in 2010/2011 financial year.
2Gauteng province consistently had highest number of motor vehicles and
motorcycles stolen in the 2010/2011 financial year when compared to other
provinces. Although the South African Police Services (SAPS) Crime Report
for 2010/2011 does not reveal how many motor vehicles and motorcycles
were stolen from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) during
the same financial year, SAPS statistics are generally inclusive.
It has also been noted that members of the SANDF are involved in many
criminal activities which harm the institution and its equipment. According to
The Provost Marshal General (2007:2) SANDF members are involved in the
theft of motor vehicles, weapons, computers, funds and rations.
The conclusions from this particular study, as well as recommendations for
further study, are formulated based on the findings of this study. These are
presented at the end of this research paper.
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
There are mechanisms in place to curb motor-vehicle theft in the SANDF but
these seem to be ineffective. For instance, when a driver has to book out a
vehicle to his/her house overnight, the fleet manager (termed the transport
officer in the SANDF) together with the unit’s Counter Intelligence officer must
certify and verify that the vehicle will be kept in a safe lock-up garage before
they authorise the action of the driver.
The researcher works in the SANDF and drives SANDF vehicles on a daily
basis. The current method used is ineffective in curbing SANDF vehicle theft
because fleet managers and Counter Intelligent Officers do not physically
conduct inspections on authorised drivers’ premises to ensure that SANDF
vehicle are parked inside safe and secured places. While the SANDF have
other methods in place that are aimed at reducing theft of SANDF vehicles,
they have also proven to be inefficient. The SANDF requires effective and
appropriate mechanisms, which will enable the institution to curb motor
vehicle theft. During this study the researcher realised that little research has
been conducted related to theft of SANDF vehicles.
3Recently a project was initiated by Defence Intelligence to install tracker
systems in all vehicles that belong to the South African National Defence
Force. While, most vehicles were fitted with the tracker system, this anti-theft
tool seemed to yield enough little impact in curbing the amount of vehicles that
were stolen.
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Motor-vehicles in the SANDF are stolen regularly, and are taken without a
trace. The problem has escalated and little has been done to provide
mechanisms that can assist in curbing theft of SANDF motor vehicles. The
study was initiated to investigate the theft of motor-vehicles in the SANDF and
the various modus operandi that were used to steal motor-vehicles. According
to the findings in the Annual Report of the South African Police Service for
2006/2007, a total number of 29 military vehicles were stolen, of which 28
were stolen by means of theft and 1 was stolen by means of robbery.
Eight vehicles that were stolen by means of theft were recovered after being
reported from the 1st of April 2006 to 31st March 2007 (SAPS report
2006/2007). Furthermore, 3 vehicles that were reported stolen were recovered
after being reported prior to 31st March 2006, according to the SAPS report. A
total number of 11 vehicles were recovered. This means 17 military vehicles
were stolen during the 2006/2007 period have still not been recovered.
Another problem is that all four arms of services namely: the South African
Army (SA Army), the South African Air Force (SAAF) and the South African
Navy (SA Navy) use different transport management policies. Furthermore,
the current transport management policy of the Department of Defence (DOD)
is still written in Afrikaans (Log 14 pamphlet, n.d.) and most current
employees are not familiar with the language and as a result, it is completely
ignored. This study focused on the problem that the South African National
Defence Force faces regarding the theft of SANDF official vehicles within the
Gauteng province. The theft of SANDF vehicles makes it difficult for the
organisation to fulfil its mandate as stated in the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa 108 of 1996, Section 200 (1) and (2) which states that: “(1)
4The defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military
force. (2) The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the
Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the
Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”.
To deal with this problem effectively, the SANDF requires pro-active rather
than reactive measures. This research was aimed at suggesting a strategy
that could be used to tackle the vehicle theft challenge.
1.4 THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The aim of this research was inter alia to develop guidelines that would assist
the SANDF Management and Officials to control and curb theft of official
vehicles in the SANDF.
The objectives of this research are:
 To investigate the factors that causes motor-vehicle theft within
the SANDF premises at Gauteng Province.
 To discuss various modus operandi used to steal motor-vehicles
within the SANDF premises.
 To determine which vehicles are targeted by thieves in the
SANDF.
 To investigate the role and responsibility of the Military Police
Division in curbing motor-vehicle theft in the SANDF premises.
 To discuss preventative measures that could be used by the
SANDF to protect motor-vehicles from being stolen.
 To determine the amount of money that the SANDF has lost as a
result of motor-vehicles theft at Gauteng Province.
 To refine some of the existing methods and procedures that are
currently used in curbing motor-vehicle theft within SANDF.
51.5 ETHICAL ISSUES
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2005:56), there are
two categories of ethical responsibilities that researchers should take into
account.
Those responsibilities include the responsibility to the research
respondents who are voluntarily taking part in the research study; and a
responsibility to follow the provided framework and be honest in
providing feedback on the research study. In ensuring responsibility
towards the research, the researcher asked each of the respondents to
take part in the study on a voluntary basis. The researcher furthermore
informed respondents about the necessity and significance of this study.
They were also informed that this research would not have any
derogatory statements towards other human beings; would not contain
any material that may harm any individual either physical or emotional.
According to Fouka and Mantzourou (2011:3), research ethics includes
complying with the mandate to protect the dignity of respondents.
Therefore respondents were not compelled to take part in this study and
they were informed that their identities would remain anonymous. The
researcher strictly adhered to the South African National Defence
Force’s Code of Conduct as well as the University of South Africa’s Code
of Ethics.
1.6 VALUE OF THE STUDY
The study has not only benefitted the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF) but it has the potential to benefit other military organisations within
the SADC (South African Development Community) countries, as well as
organisations such as the United Nations, African Union and countries that
experience a similar challenge with regard to vehicle theft. Future researchers
who might embark on a similar study will definitely find this study valuable to
their research. In addition, this study intends to make a contribution to the
6academic community by increasing the knowledge regarding the topic, namely
the: Prevention of theft of SANDF official vehicles within the Gauteng
Province.
1.7 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING RESEARCH
It was challenging to access information from the South African National
Defence Force because most of it is considered to be classified. Theft of
SANDF vehicles is a topic that has not been well researched, and there is little
academic literature available concerning the theft of SANDF vehicles. During
the study the researcher had embarked on a comparative study and finally
had to discard this avenue of research because the United States of America,
Canada, Australia and United Kingdom were not forth-coming with sharing
their information about the theft of military vehicles. While the researcher
attempted to gather some information via the respective embassies, it was
comprehensively explained to the researcher that such information was top
secret. Furthermore, another challenge during this research was that most
documents that are available within the SANDF are still written in Afrikaans.
The researcher required someone to translate the documents to English
before these became useful, and that has been a time consuming exercise.
1.8 RESEARCH STRUCTURE
Chapter 1: General Orientation. This chapter serves as an introduction
which is aimed at orientating the reader about theft of motor-vehicles in the
South African National Defence Force in Gauteng province.
Chapter 2: Methodology and Literature Review. This chapter covers the
method used to conduct the research.
Chapter 3: Causes and the extent of motor-vehicle theft in the SANDF
premises. This chapter analyses the causes and the extent of the problem,
including the modus operandi that was used in stealing military vehicles within
the South African National Defence Force premises and outside the premises.
Chapter 4: Security Status of SANDF Vehicles. This chapter analyse the
security status of SANDF vehicles, specifically the general security of vehicles
while in the units/bases as well as outside the military unit/base.
Chapter 5: Findings. This chapter discusses all the findings with regard to
7the theft of SANDF vehicles in Gauteng Province.
Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusions. This chapter provides a
description of possible methods that could be used in order to prevent the
theft of SANDF vehicles. It also provides the conclusion of the research.
8CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Welman, Kruger and Mitchel (2005:2) defined research as a process aimed at
obtaining scientific knowledge by means of a number of objective methods
and procedures.  Therefore research methodology take cognisance and
explains the logic behind research methods and techniques (Welman et al.,
2005:2). All forms of researches whether qualitative or quantitative, must be
auditable, disciplined, systematic approach to uncovering new information by
using the most appropriate method regarding the question being asked
(Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge, 2009:6).
2.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
A largely qualitative research method was employed for this study, and data
was generated through personal interviews (unstructured) with respondents.
Where quantitative research method was used, data was generated through
statistics. The statistics were obtained from the Military Police (MP) and the
South African Police Services (SAPS) to supplement the qualitative approach.
2.2.1 Qualitative Methodology
According to a Qualitative Research Methods Overview (n.d.), qualitative
research is a type of scientific research. Simplistically, it is scientific research
that is aimed at finding answers to questions. The answers are often obtained
in a more systematic manner that makes use of an advanced and defined set
of procedures. Additionally, qualitative research is a method that seeks to
understand a given research problem or topic from the perspectives of the
local population it involves (Qualitative Research Methods Overview, n.d.).
Neumann (1997:328) stated that qualitative reports have a rich description
containing colourful details and unusual characters instead of straight forward
statistics. Denzin and Lincoln (1994:4) as quoted by Welman et al. (2005:8)
defined the word qualitative as an emphasis on the process and meanings
that are extremely thorough examined by measuring its quantity, amount of
intensity or frequency. Furthermore Welman et al. (2005:8) mentioned that the
9qualitative research method emphasised reality, the relationship between the
researcher and the object, as well as the value laden nature of the enquiry.
Welman et al. (2005:188) described qualitative research as an approach
rather than a design or set of techniques. Du Plooy (2007:35) was of the
opinion that the advantage of a qualitative research method is access to
information that leads to a shared responsibility and the development of
knowledge competencies. Schwartz (2009) stated that qualitative research is
used to denote approaches that are supported by a set of hypotheses
concerning the way the social world functions.
Schwartz (2009) further mentioned that the qualitative research method
investigates the relationships and patterns among factors of the context in
which the activity happens. Qualitative research is concentrated on
understanding the full many-dimensional picture of the subject investigation.
Schwartz (2009) also stated that qualitative methods are helpful not only in
giving rich explanations of complex phenomena, but also in creating or
evolving theories or conceptual bases, and in proposing hypotheses to clarify
the phenomena.
According to the Qualitative Research Methods Overview guide (n.d.),
qualitative methods are more flexible because they allow greater spontaneity
and adaption of the interaction between the researcher and the study
participant. Qualitative research method asks mostly “open-ended questions”,
where respondents are free to respond in their words, and these responses
tend to be more complex than simply “yes” or “no”. It is for these reasons that
a qualitative method was used for this study.
2.2.2 Advantages of qualitative research methodology
Hancock et al. (2009:6) posited that the qualitative research method focuses
mainly on how a group of individuals from a different background can perceive
reality in different manners from one another. Ultimately, the Qualitative
research method analyses the natural behavioural setting as data and ensure
that there is no manipulation of variables (Hancock et al., 2009:6).
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McRoy (n.d.) believed that qualitative approaches have the advantages of in-
depth analysis, flexibility, and the potential to observe a variety of aspects of a
social situation. Furthermore through the use of questions to retrieve answers,
the researcher has the ability to gain comprehensive understanding of the
respondent’s attitudes, beliefs and the situation. The qualitative research
method’s primary strength is uncovering much about people’s experiences by
finding out why things may be the way they are.
Moreover, by developing and using questions on the spot, a qualitative
researcher can gain a more in-depth understanding of the respondent's
beliefs, attitudes, or situation (McRoy, n.d.). Qualitative methods are typically
more flexible in that they provide more room for adaptation between the
researcher and the respondent. An example in this regard is that qualitative
methods ask mainly “open-ended” questions that are not necessarily worded
in the same manner for every participant.
Open-ended questions are flexible in the sense that participants are afforded
the liberty to answer the questions in their own words (Qualitative Research
Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide, n.d.). In addition, with qualitative
methods, the relationship between the researcher and the participant is often
less formal than in quantitative research. Participants have the opportunity to
respond more elaborately and in greater detail than is typically the case with
quantitative methods (Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field
Guide, n.d.).
Conversely, the researcher has the opportunity to respond immediately to
what participants say by tailoring subsequent questions to information the
participant has provided. It is important to note, however, that there was a
range of flexibility among methods used in both quantitative and qualitative
research and that flexibility was not an indication of the scientific rigour the
method displayed. Rather, the degree of flexibility reflects the kind of
understanding of the problem that is being pursued using the method.
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2.2.3 Disadvantages of qualitative research methodology
A qualitative research method collects data about what the selected group of
participants or individuals think or how they behave. It places the researcher
in a disadvantaged position since the data cannot be used to make any
assumptions beyond the specific group of participants (Jones, n.d.). This type
of a research method is time consuming according to Jones (n.d.), and has
the propensity to be biased to the researcher’s interpretations of the research.
2.3 RESEARCH METHODS
2.3.1 Literature review
According to Taylor (n.d.) a literature review is written ideas of what has been
published about a topic by accredited scholars and researchers. Lie (n.d.)
defined a literature review as an effective evaluation of chosen documents on
a particular research topic. Cronin, Ryan and Coughlan (2008:38) defined a
literature review as a thorough summary which is objective in summarising
and critical in analysing all relevant available research and non-research
literature on the study being undertaken. A literature review thoroughly studies
the current scholarly work available on a particular subject (Literature Review
hand-out, n.d.).
This study used both primary and secondary sources. Welman et al.
(2005:41) defined a primary source as the original works, books, magazines
articles, films and sound recordings which reflects the information first-hand.
Secondary sources include commentaries, explanations, elucidations,
etcetera, which other writers have done on the primary sources and these are
easier to locate than primary literature because these sources are covered
more thoroughly by the tertiary/secondary literature.
2.3.2 The role of literature review
Literature reviews provides readers with easy access to research on a
particular topic by selecting high quality articles or studies that are relevant,
meaningful, important and valid. These are then summarised into one
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complete report. Literature review provides an excellent starting point for
researchers who have recently commenced with a research topic in a new
area by forcing them to summarise, evaluate, and compare original research
in that speciﬁc area. It ensures that researchers do not duplicate work that has
already been done. It can provide clues as to where future research is
heading or recommend areas on which to focus. Literature reviews
emphasises pertinent ﬁndings, and it has the potential to identify
inconsistencies, gaps and contradictions. It provides a constructive analysis of
the methodologies and approaches of other researchers (Writing a literature
review, 2004:1).
2.3.3 Primary and secondary sources
2.3.3.1 Primary sources
Primary sources are original sources constructed or created by individuals
who were present during the time of the event (Guide to reading primary
sources, n.d.). Neumann (1997:396) defined a primary source by giving
examples such as: diaries, novels, movies, articles, photographs. Neumann
(1997:396) further said that these sources can be found in archives, private
collections, in family closets and in museums.  Roosevelt (n.d.) provided a
more comprehensive definition of a primary source by saying it is a record
created by a direct participant in an event or activity in the past.
Roosevelt (n.d.) further said primary sources are not always documents, since
these can include maps, drawings or objects.  Primary sources include
original articles or books, as well as letters, films, short stories, plays, poems,
photographs, court cases, journal articles, newspaper events, and speeches.
A speech by the Minister of Finance, for example, is a primary source since it
is generated by the Minister (Distinguish between primary and secondary
sources, 2003:1).
Primary sources are flexible and allow the researcher to analyse and interpret
opinions of other authors regarding the stated research question (Distinguish
between primary and secondary sources, 2003:1). Primary sources are also
known as first-hand information directly from the source or person, such as a
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diary, because it is written by a person or individual in his/her own hand
writing.
2.3.3.2 Secondary sources
Neumann (1997: 397) mentioned that primary sources are authentic and real
as compared to secondary sources. However, the practical limitation of time
can restrict research concerning many primary sources to a narrow time frame
or location. To retrieve more understanding and be exposed to a broader
picture, many researchers resort to making use of secondary sources, in order
to gather more information written by historians who spent years studying
primary sources (Neumann, 1997:397).
Secondary sources contain more information because they interpret, analyse,
offer commentary and draw conclusions about the events detailed in primary
sources. Information is always made accessible to the public by putting
together and interpreting from a number of primary sources (Distinguish
between primary and secondary sources, 2003:1). Secondary sources include
journal articles, books, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, reviews, newspaper
articles, as well as specific essays and other types of recordings (Distinguish
between primary and secondary sources, 2003:1).
Most research papers are based on secondary sources as they build on the
research or study that others have done (Distinguish between primary and
secondary sources, 2003:1). Primary sources are directly taken from an
individual or group of individuals, while secondary sources garner information
from an individual or group and analyse the topic. Secondary source
information helps researchers to decide whether the source at hand is indeed
either a primary or secondary source (Distinguish between primary and
secondary sources, 2003:1).
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2.4 RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
2.4.1 Interviews
McRoy (n.d.) stated that it is always easy for researcher to conduct face-to-
face interviews since the interview schedule provides the researcher with an
opportunity to probe further if the researcher realised that the respondent may
have new information. Neumann (1997:253) agreed with McRoy (n.d.) that
face-to-face interviews are always an advantage because these allow the
longest questionnaires and furthermore, interviews have the highest response
rates. Interviews that are conducted telephonically provide the interviewer with
the liberty to observe the surroundings and the usage of nonverbal
communication and sometimes visual aids (McRoy, n.d.). Interviewers can
ask a variety of questions and also can use comprehensive probes. Interviews
allows the researcher to observe the respondent’s bodily expression, mood,
voice intonation, and any other environmental factors that might directly or
indirectly influence the interviewee's responses (Qualitative Research
Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide, n.d.).
2.4.2 Unstructured interviews
Unstructured interviews are normally used in explorative research for the
purposes: “to identify important variables in a particular area, to formulate
penetrating questions on them and to generate hypothesis for further
investigation”, (Welman et al., 2005:197). This type of interview provides the
interviewer with a broader scope of information, comparatively more than
other forms of data-collecting methods because of their qualitative nature.
Unstructured interviews differ from structured interviews in that these
suggests the general theme of discussion and pose further questions as these
are identified in the spontaneous development of the interaction between the
interviewer and research participant (Welman et al., 2005:198).
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The researcher decided to use unstructured interviews because most of the
respondents were junior ranking officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in
the SANDF. The purpose of utilising an unstructured interview platform was to
ensure that the junior ranking officer and the Non-Commissioned Officers felt
comfortable, instead of under pressure to answer a list of questions.
Unstructured interviews ensure that respondents are able to respond freely,
without fear of answering “correctly”.
2.4.3 Advantages of unstructured interviews
Welman et al. (2005:201) provided an opinion that unstructured interviews are
immeasurable useful when the researcher wants to set in motion an
explorative investigation as well as pre-testing a questionnaire. Another
advantage according to Welman et al. (2005:201) is that unstructured
interviews help to define concepts and clarify problems and also permit the
establishment of a list of possible answers and solutions which, on the other
hand serve to facilitates the construction of multiple-choice questions as well
as the elimination of superfluous questions (Welman et al., 2005:201).
2.4.4 Disadvantages of unstructured interviews
Welman et al. (2005:201) mentioned that when the interviewers are involved
and in direct control of the respondents, it may cause a situation whereby the
researcher or interviewer can be biased. This type of interview may be time
consuming because some interview sessions can last for days. Unstructured
interviews may also be time consuming and can be costly financially because
the interviewer needs to make provision for travelling expenses, meals, and
even accommodation expenses if the interviews are held out-of-town
(Welman et al., 2005:201).
2.4.5 Observation
Patrick (n.d.) defined observation as a study of both explicit and tacit cultural
knowledge. Observation in qualitative data uses words whilst quantitative data
makes use of numbers. Mulhall (2003:306) mentioned that observation is
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mainly utilised in two ways, either structured or unstructured. The researcher
is guided by the research question regarding which method to choose.
Driscoll (2011:160) is of the opinion that observation is suitable for almost any
subject matter, although the kind of observation would depend on the
research question. Driscoll (2011:160) further mentioned that a person might
observe traffic or parking patterns on campus in order to get a sense of what
improvements could be made. Observing people is an exercise that should be
conducted cautiously and with great consideration, such as obtaining their
consent (Driscoll, 2011:160).
The researcher for this particular research study used observations because
these provide a distinct picture of the research topic. Observations were
conducted at 13 Combat Ready Provost Company (Thaba Tshwane), Military
Police School (Thaba Tshwane), Defence Headquarters (Erasmuskloof),
Defence Works Formation HQ (Thaba Tshwane), Bank of Lisbon (Pretoria
Central) and Poyntons Building (Pretoria Central). The researcher found it
easy to observe in a manner known as participant observation, where the
observer needs to be part of the community that was being observed
(Welman et al., 2005:194). The researcher, being part of the SANDF, ensured
that those being observed would not suspect anything during the observation.
During the observation the researcher took notes. As soon as the researcher
entered a unit/base he was able to see vehicles parked outside the various
buildings at the chosen locations. He was also privy to observing the
behavioural pattern of the guards at the gate.
2.4.6 Advantages of observation
Foster (n.d.) believed that observation technique has got a number of
advantages as compared to interviews and questionnaires. It is a method that
provides more information about the physical environment and about the
human behaviour. It also puts the researcher in an advantageous position
because he or she can record the information directly without having to rely on
the retrospective or anticipatory account of other people (Foster, n.d.).
Another advantage is that through observation the researcher is always at a
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better position to see other things that the participants could not see. This is
due to numerous features of the environment that are ignored or taken for
granted by respondents and may therefore be not easy for them to describe
(Foster, n.d.).
2.4.7 Disadvantages of observation
There are also some limitations according to Foster (n.d.), such as the
inaccessibility of the environment which may render the observation
impossible. This may be attributed to social norms such as human sexual
behaviours for example.
Another disadvantage is that once people realise that they are observed, they
may consciously or unconsciously change the way they behave because they
are being observed and that may render the observational account inaccurate.
2.5 RESEARCH SAMPLE
Neumann (1997:201) defined a sampling as: “a process of systematically
selecting cases for inclusion in a research project”. In simple terms a research
sample is small group of a population, which is selected for the sole purpose
of a certain research project. The sample in this project comprised of
members of the SANDF from various corps mustering who were randomly
selected considering their involvement with SANDF vehicles from their units /
bases. The sample also consists of members of the Military Police Division
who are directly involved in crime prevention and crime investigation with
Gauteng Province.
The reason for selecting the sample was because these individuals have been
directly or indirectly involved either in the management of SANDF vehicles
within their respective units/bases or in the investigation of theft of SANDF
vehicles as members of the Military Police Division. It is not necessary to
collect data from each and every person in the community but only a small
group or few individuals are required to create a saturation point of similar
information (Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide,
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n.d.). The study sample group was not randomly selected since this is a
qualitative study. A qualitative study is aimed at obtaining primary information
that is rich instead of representing the whole group (Welman et al., 2005:56).
This technique enables the researcher to have more accurate information
from the respondents.
2.6 DATA ANALYSIS
Welman et al. (2005: 211) mentioned that a qualitative data analysis
entails detailed notes which are hand written, tape recordings and
observations. During interviews the researcher made notes by hand and
later converted the notes into write-ups which are readable. There was
little data that was collected through statistics although the little that was
obtained was analysed in a tabular format. These statistics consider the
number of SANDF vehicles stolen per year and the modus operandi that
was used to steal the vehicles, as well as the monetary value of each
motor-vehicle, together with total loss that the SANDF has suffered.
Taylor-Powell and Kenner (2003:2) suggested an analysis process that
includes three steps, namely: get to know your data, focus the analysis
and categorize information. The “get to know your data” step involves
understanding the data collected. The researcher has to read the data
and re-read for the sake better understanding. The “focus the analysis”
step means that the researcher should formulate and identify a few
questions that the researcher would like the analysis to answer and write
them down.
The last step of categorizing information may refer to the coding of data. It
does not involve assigning numerical codes as in the case of a
quantitative analysis where exclusive variables are labelled by codes or
values (Taylor-Powell et al., 2003:2). Since this research is mainly of a
qualitative nature, all data collected qualitatively was interpreted by the
researcher.
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2.7 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY
Shenton (2003:63) explained that trustworthiness of qualitative research is in
most cases questioned by positivists and this could be attributed to the fact
that their concept of reliability and validity cannot be addressed in a manner in
which naturalistic investigators work. A different terminology has always been
preferred by naturalistic investigators in order to distance them from a
positivist paradigm (Shenton, 2003:63).
Guba and Lincoln (1985) as quoted by Shenton (2003:63) made a proposal
of four criteria that should be considered by qualitative researchers to ensure
trustworthiness of studies. The criteria as proposed by Guba and Lincoln
(1985) are credibility, confirmability, transferability and dependability.
Credibility notes the evaluation of data in order to find out whether the findings
of the study are “credible” according to the conceptual interpretation of data
gathered from respondents (Lincoln & Guba, 1985 as quoted by Shenton,
2003:63). Confirmability measures how well the research findings are
supported by the data collected; whether from respondents or from various
sources. Transferability is the extent to which the findings of the research can
be applied or be transferred beyond the project. Dependability is the
evaluation of the various data collection, data analysis and theory generation
of the project (Lincoln & Guba, 1985 as quoted by Shenton, 2003:63).
2.8 CONCLUSION
There is limited information on the research subject from the SANDF, in
particular the Military Police and the SAPS. The dearth of information
available in the SANDF is nonetheless protected by means of a security
classification. Therefore, a qualitative research supplemented by unstructured
interviews was the most appropriate option.
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CHAPTER 3: CAUSES AND THE EXTENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT
WITHIN THE SANDF PREMISES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Motor vehicle theft is a crime that affects many South Africans irrespective of
their colour, race, gender, age or religion and it affects them both directly and
indirectly.  Motor vehicles theft does not have jurisdiction because it happens
almost everywhere, every day and anytime. Thieves have always been seen
as the main cause of suffering in civilized society. Longman (n.d.) wrote as
early as in 1906, that criminals such as Bonnet and Dillinger in France or
Bonnie and Clyde in the United States of America (USA) stole vehicles in
order to commit their evil deeds.
There are no records stipulating the year in which the first military vehicle was
stolen. According to Davis (2003:174), the first motor vehicle (in general) to be
stolen in South Africa was recorded in 1976 in the form of a hijacking. The
driver was approached by four men armed with knives, overpowered and
forced out of his car. Since then vehicle theft has been on the increase in
South Africa (Davis, 2003). In a media statement from the office of the
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (2007), it was
mentioned that the risk of vehicle crime escalated within each race group,
explaining that Asians and whites in Pretoria are at the greatest risk of vehicle
theft.
The South African Police Services (SAPS) Commissioner was not referring
directly to the theft of military vehicles but was referring to theft of motor
vehicles in general. According to the South African Police Service (SAPS)
Annual Report for 2008/2009, 29 military vehicles were reported stolen but
what the SAPS Annual Report could not reveal is whether the 29 military
vehicles were stolen in Gauteng or in South Africa (the report provided only
national figures). The Commissioner’s statement suggests that the SAPS
Annual Report also caters for the theft of military vehicles, so it could be said
that the Commissioner of police was also referring to military vehicles.
Nqakula (2007) further stated that 70 percent of motor vehicles were stolen in
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Pretoria suburbs and only 20 percent were stolen in townships, 4 percent
stolen from places in the inner city and 3 percent from informal settlements.
Military vehicles are stolen just like any motor vehicle in South Africa since
they are driven by human beings and on the same roads that are used by any
other motor vehicle. Motor vehicles are stolen for a number of reasons. Some
people steal motor vehicles because they want to resell the vehicle to make a
profit. Others commit vehicle theft because they want to use the vehicle for
their own consumption. Some vehicles are stolen to be used as either a mode
of transport by the thief and sometimes vehicles are stolen in order to strip the
motor vehicle for the parts to be fitted in existing vehicles.
This chapter is dedicated to analyse the types, causes, reasons, and modus
operandi that are used by thieves in stealing military vehicles and other
vehicles in general. Finally, the extent of motor vehicles theft in the SANDF is
discussed. Although there is a shortage of literature investigating offender
motivation for committing motor vehicle theft in the SANDF, some general
information can be identified and utilised.
3.2 CAUSES OF MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT
Motor vehicle thefts can be associated with social deprivation characterised
by low income, low levels of education and high rates of unemployment. Most
offenders steal motor vehicles because it offers a way of making quick cash in
order to maintain a lifestyle which is beyond the perpetrator’s means (Casey,
2007:2). Unemployment is related to poverty, and low income is frequently
mentioned as an example of factors that contribute to crime in general
(Bunge, Johnson & Baldé, and 2005:20). Bunge et al. (2005:20) further
suggested that employment reduces the risks of engaging in criminal
activities, whereas families and individuals that are living in low income
situations normally have reduced chances of engaging in organised
recreational activities. Davis (2003:174) agreed that socioeconomic factors
such as poverty and unemployment played a significant role in the escalation
of crime in South Africa. In the researchers’ opinion unemployment does not
always play a direct role in the theft of military vehicles because some soldiers
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that are involved in the theft are obviously employed but their accomplices are
unemployed.
During an interview with the Head of Investigations at Thaba Tshwane Military
Police Station (Captain Gcule) on 26 January 2012, he mentioned that there
are groups of unemployed persons who operate syndicates that target military
vehicles around Pretoria and he believes that had these members been
employed, they would probably not be involved in crime especially motor
vehicle theft. He further said that these syndicates also target members of the
SANDF who might not earn good salaries and fail to provide adequately for
their families (lower level ranking members) and therefore they are vulnerable
and easily exploitable by these syndicates.
Cowdrey (2006:6) stated that for any crime to occur there has to be motivated
offenders which would be people with a need, desire and/or drive to commit
crime by breaking the particular legal rules. Furthermore there has to be
incentives and opportunities to commit that particular crime. Cowdrey (2006:6)
added that most people are confronted by opportunities to commit crime on
daily basis but they do not succumb or maybe they do not even notice.
Motivated offenders require incentives in order to commit a crime, incentives
emanate from financial need, peer pressure, mood disturbance and, greed
(Cowdrey, 2006:7). During another interview with an investigating officer
(Sergeant Kenosi) at Thaba Tshwane Military Police Station on 25 January
2012, the investigator mentioned the fact thatsome soldiers steal military
vehicles because of debts that are beyond their means of repayments;
therefore they steal cars in order to gain financially.
The investigator explained that other soldiers steal vehicles because they
notice the opportunities which emanate from the lack of security measures
and therefore take advantage of the situation but not because they are in
financial crisis. She also stated that soldiers steal cars because they used to
steal cars when they were civilians and even after joining the SANDF they
cannot abandon their bad habit, as they want to prove to their peers that they
can still perform these acts of crime that are considered “normal” in the
societies from which many soldiers come.
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During an interview with the Case Management System Supervisor (Warrant
Officer Class 2, Pretorius) at Thaba Tshwane Military Police Station on 19
January 2012, he revealed that most SANDF vehicles are stolen by members
of the organisation. He gave an example that in some cases a civilian vehicle
would enter a unit with two people in the vehicle (wearing civilian clothes) and
the guards would open the gate without asking questions or noticing how
many people are in the vehicle. When the vehicle left the unit, only a driver
would be inside the car and the other person who posed as a passenger
would be driving a military vehicle. The guards would still open the gate
without asking questions and the military vehicle would be gone. Sometimes,
offender would cut through fences in order to steal a military vehicle.
According to Casey (2007:210), there is adequate evidence that confirms the
importance of analysing the social background of offenders. For example,
factors such as inadequate schooling, unemployment, and social deprivation
have been identified as contributing factors. Although unemployment is not
directly the cause of the high rate of theft in the SANDF, it is indirectly a
contributing factor to vehicle theft. The employed members of the SANDF are
familiar with the routines and procedures at their various units/bases, and
therefore they are able to recruit their ‘unemployed’ friends either to aid them
or to personally undertake the stealing of military vehicles after they have
been briefed thoroughly about the security measures in place in that particular
unit/base.
Out of all the reasons that might contribute to motor vehicle theft, as
described by Tang (2009:58) and Casey (2007:210), unemployment cannot
be the sole reason for SANDF members to steal vehicles from the
organisation where they are employed. Another possible reason for SANDF
vehicle theft could be for household consumption, where the car is either sold
or otherwise traded for basic household commodities such as food, clothing,
housing, utilities, transportation and education. As previously mentioned,
members of the SANDF find themselves on the wrong side of the law and in
most cases it could be because they are struggling financially to provide
adequately for their families. Nevertheless, crime is wrong and should not be
condoned.
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On 26 August 2009 almost 3000 soldiers marched to the Union Buildings in
Pretoria demanding a 30 percent wage increase (SANews.gov.za, 2009).
Most SANDF members including the researcher had been struggling to make
ends meet until the salary increase was announced by the President of the
Republic of South Africa on 16 December 2009. Before that, soldiers were
underpaid and that could have been a reason for some members to resort to
crime in order to better provide for their families.
After the salary increase for soldiers in 2009, the number of military vehicles
stolen in 2010 increased to 21 when compared to 8 that were stolen in 2009
and only 9 were stolen in 2011. (Military Police Cases Reported in 2005 –
2010). From the statistics, it is suggested that soldiers are involved in crime
especially SANDF motor vehicle theft reason for the theft to sustain
themselves and their families because their salaries are inadequate. The
researcher cannot rule out that a possibility that the 21 vehicles stolen in 2010
could not be necessarily attributed to the salaries of soldiers, but the 2010
world cup might have created an opportunity.
3.3 REASONS FOR MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT
Research suggests that there are many reasons that can be attributed to
motor vehicle theft worldwide, but there are four commonly known reasons:
(1) joyriding, whereby a vehicle is stolen for the purpose of driving around.
Such vehicles are quickly recovered and normally not far from where they
were stolen from. (2) Transportation is another reason vehicles are stolen and
they are stolen for personal used and they are normally abandoned when the
thieves have reached their destination. (3) Commission of other crimes is
another reason for vehicles to be stolen, and often thieves stole vehicles just
to rush to another crime scene; to commit another crime and the vehicle
would be abandoned after they reached their destination or after they
accomplished their mission of committing another crime. (4) the fourth reason
is profit or commercial theft; in this case a vehicle is stolen for profit or simply
for commercial gain (Shield, Miethe and Timothy, 2010; Quinn, n.d.).
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These reasons involve expensive and instrumental motives. Instrumental
motives occur when a vehicle is stolen for a desire to benefit financially either
by selling the whole vehicle or by selling the vehicle parts to chop-shops
(Shield et al, 2010). During an interview with Thaba Tshwane Military Police
Investigating Officer on 25 January 2012, she mentioned that in October 2011
a 16 seater Toyota Quantum was stolen at the Military Police School (MP
School) by a person working at the school. Fortunately the vehicle was
recovered within a week after it was stolen. The person who stole the vehicle
confessed after he was interrogated during the investigation process,
culminating in the recovery of the vehicle. According to the investigating
officer, the person confessed and explained that his reason for stealing the
vehicle was because he was in a serious financial crisis and he desperately
needed some extra cash.
The Provost Marshal General (2007:6) found out that military vehicles that are
beyond economic repair (BER) are sold at SANDF auctions, therefore
syndicates make use of the military vehicles’ unique engine numbers and
chassis numbers on a vehicle that is already stolen. He further said that it
becomes easy for the syndicates to register the vehicle because the
Department of Defence (DOD) Logistic system does not have any connection
with the Electronic National Traffic Administration System (e-NATIS).
According to the Military Police Division National Crime Estimates for the
2010/2011 Financial Year (annual report), the military vehicles are stolen in
order to be stripped of their parts and accessories and in some instances
engines are stolen from military vehicles while still parked inside the units. The
report further suggested that commodities in the SANDF are easily accessible
due to a lack of security. Security and proper control of assets in the SANDF
is inadequate, that is why it is very easy for a person to steal and duplicate a
vehicle key without being noticed. The Provost Marshal General (2007:7)
further mentioned that there are syndicates operating in Gauteng area and
they are willing to pay up-to R1200 for a set of keys in order to make duplicate
keys, their target group being the military drivers.
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Another cause for motor vehicle theft according to the Arizona Auto Theft
Study (2004:9) is to trade the vehicle for drugs and sometimes the vehicle can
be used to transport drugs from one location to another. In some instances,
military vehicles are used in the commission of criminal activities such as
transporting stolen items (Military Police Division National Crime Estimates –
2010/11 Financial Year, Annual Report). According to the South African
Insurance Crime Report (SAICB, 2010), vehicles are sometimes stolen in
order to finance other crimes. In the Interpol report as quoted in the SAICB
Report (2010:2) these vehicles can also be used to commit other crimes or
are used as bomb carriers, the same bombs that can be used to blast open
ATMs.
For any crime to occur, there must be a motivation to offenders (people with a
need, desire and/or drive to commit a crime by simply breaking the particular
legal rules), and there must be an incentive and opportunity to commit a
particular crime (Cowdrey, 2006:6). Opportunities presents themselves to
people to commit crime every day, but most people do not succumb or notice
those opportunities (Cowdrey, 2006:6).
The Military Police Division National Crime Estimates for the 2010/2011
Financial Year suggested that the theft of important commodities in the
SANDF such as fuel, military vehicles, and computer equipment amongst
others resulted in low productivity. Out of sight areas, poor visibility in
units/bases and inadequate security and control measures provided perfect
opportunities for thieves to steal military equipment especially military
vehicles. According to the report, there are no cases where a vehicle was
stolen for recreational purposes but was rather stolen for financial gain.
Another motivating factor according to Casey (2007:6) is symbolic importance.
Car ownership can show a sense of power and status, which explains why
offenders would steal cars sell them and use the money to purchase material
items to display to the public or community. By displaying their expensive
items, the community would be under the impression that they (thieves) have
overcome their financial difficulties. Such offenders generally spend their
money to luxury items such as clothing and jewellery.
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The researcher is of the opinion this might not be necessarily the fact with
regard to SANDF members. However, it might be a fact with regard to the
syndicates that exploit SANDF members to help them steal military vehicles
easily. As the Provost Marshal General (2007:7) stated, there is normally a
“finger-man” that is involved in helping or facilitating the stealing of a particular
military vehicle. In the researcher’s understanding, a ‘finger-man’ is the person
that would help either by providing information to his accomplices or would
steal the vehicle key, duplicate it and hand over the duplicate key to his
accomplices. There are 6 military vehicles that were stolen between 2005 and
2010 by means of a duplicate key, but there were more than just these 6
vehicles stolen. In some cases of SANDF vehicle theft the modus operandi
remains unknown.
According to Wallace (2001:1) car parking lots are mainly common places
where motor vehicle theft occurs, followed by streets and single homes which
include garages and driveways. Wallace (2001:1) further revealed that
together all these locations contributes 87 percent of all motor vehicle theft in
Canada. From 2005 to 2010 there were 40 military vehicles that were stolen
while parked inside military units or bases in Gauteng according to the Military
Police Division reported cases. The same report also revealed that there were
14 military vehicles that were stolen while parked on the streets in Pretoria
Central Business District (CBD) and 26 military vehicles were stolen while
parked in single homes, which included garages and driveways in Gauteng.
The Provost Marshal General (PMG) (2007:2) said he believed that the theft
of motor vehicles in the SANDF is syndicate related and that these groups
only target motor vehicles that are in high demand. The PMG (2007:3) further
mentioned that SANDF motor vehicles are stolen for parts such as batteries,
engine parts and tyres. The PMG statement is in agreement with the definition
of motor vehicle theft by Jochelson and da Huong (1993:24) of acquisitive
vehicle theft where vehicles are stolen for resale or dismantling of parts which
are solely for profit. Kennedy (n.d.) called this type of motor vehicle theft as
commercial theft, where cars are only stolen to be resold.
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It is a general practice that body shops often take stolen cars, file off serial
numbers and change the look of the car in order to resell the vehicle.
Financially motivated offenders steal motor cars for financial benefit either by
selling the vehicle parts or by committing insurance fraud (Shield et al., 2010).
In the researcher’s view SANDF motor vehicles cannot be stolen in order to
commit insurance fraud since they are not insured like civilian vehicles and
SANDF vehicles are not attached to any individual’s name but to the
government and the SANDF is the account holder. Furthermore the
researcher believes that some reasons that may be attributed to theft of
SANDF official vehicles are commercial purposes, either to sell the whole
vehicle or to dismantle it and sell its parts to the black market whether in
South Africa or in neighbouring countries such as Namibia, Swaziland,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia or Lesotho (Naudé, Prinsloo &
Ladikos, 2006:31).
Every military unit or base is allocated with a number of vehicles ranging from
sedans, to bakkies and, trucks, while other units have armoured vehicles.
These vehicles are kept within the unit’s carports and hangers. The places
where these vehicles are kept are called Transport Parks (TP) and some
transport parks are not completely secured in terms of Closed Circuit Camera
Televisions (CCTV). The only security measure that is in place are the guards
with weapons and most of them are not reliable since they are sometimes
involved as the “middlemen”, as the Provost Marshal General explained
(2007:7).
According to the Military Police Division reported cases between 2005 and
2010, forty military vehicles were stolen from units/bases parking areas. If
there were CCTV cameras installed, it might have been possible to recover
some of the vehicles because the SANDF would be able to possibly identify
the culprits. Most of these vehicles were stolen at Thaba Tshwane and its
surrounding units or military bases. Currently the recovery rate of stolen
military vehicle is almost zero. Table 3.1 shows the number of military vehicles
stolen in Gauteng between 2005 and 2010, per year:
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Table 3.1: The number of SANDF motor vehicles stolen from 2005 – 2010 in Gauteng
(SANDF. Military Police Division Cases Reported from 2005 – 2011)
Out of the 86 military motor vehicles stolen in Gauteng from 2005 to 2010, the
majority of them were stolen in Pretoria. The researcher is of the opinion that
the reason for these Pretoria-based thefts are because Pretoria is the SANDF
Headquarters and consists of comparatively many more military vehicles than
Johannesburg or any part of the country. Table 3.2 displays the number of
military vehicles stolen in Pretoria, Johannesburg and other parts of Gauteng
from 2005 to 2010 (Military Police Division Cases Reported from 2005 –
2010):
Year Pretoria Johannesburg Other parts of
Gauteng
2005 10 0 0
2006 No data No data 0
2007 24 0 0
2008 20 3 0
2009 8 0 0
2010 21 0 0
Total 83 3 0
Table 3.2: The number of military vehicles stolen in Pretoria, Johannesburg and other parts of
Gauteng from 2005 to 2010. (SANDF Military Police Division Cases Reported from 2005 –
2011)
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3.4 TYPES OF MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT
3.4.1 Opportunistic theft
Gant and Grabosky (2001:1) stated that in the year 2000, 139,000 motor
vehicles were stolen in Australia and about 80 per cent of the stolen vehicles
were recovered immediately after they were stolen. They further mentioned
that three-quarters of the motor vehicle theft in Australia was opportunistic,
meaning that they were stolen for joy-riding or for transportation proposes and
that is the reason they were recovered immediately after they were stolen
(Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Theft Final Report, 2002).
This opportunistic type of crime is only committed because the opportunity
presents itself. The vehicle is available with inadequate security and thieves
seize the opportunity and steal the particular vehicle for their own use, such
as transportation. The study guide for Investigation of Crime II (Mattheus,
Grobler, Struwig, Pienaar and Sittert, 2001:4) states that this type of theft
happens when someone see an opportunity to steal a car such as when a
driver leaves keys in the ignition.
Once a destination is reached, the car is abandoned. Cars stolen for joyriding
are easily recovered and the suspect(s) is usually traceable by means of
fingerprints. Copes and Cherbonneau (2006:920) mentioned that auto theft is
a crime that could happen anytime, it only requires a ‘larceny sense’ to
recognise and exploit an opportunity. The current statistics obtainable in the
SANDF do not show an indication that SANDF vehicles are stolen for short
term use. In fact, most vehicles stolen from the SANDF are not recovered
instantly, and the majority are not recovered at all.
3.4.2 Organised theft
Wallace (2004:9) defined criminal organisation as stated in Section 467.1 of
the Criminal Code of Canada: “Criminal organisation means a group, however
organised, that: (1) is composed of 3 or more persons in or outside Canada;
and (2) has as one of its main purposed or main activities the facilitation or
commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely
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result in the direct or indirect receipt of material benefit, including a financial
benefit, by the group or by one of the persons who constitute the group.”
Finklea (2010:3) further defined organised crime as: “the unlawful activities of
the members of a highly organised, disciplined association engaged in
supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling,
prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labour racketeering, and other unlawful
activities of members of such organisations.” Essentially, organised crime can
also be defined as structured groups committing serious crime for profit. There
are motor vehicle theft syndicates that specialise in the theft and sale of stolen
motor vehicles. These rings either sell the motor vehicle parts or opt to sell the
entire motor vehicle.
Vehicle theft rings do not involve themselves in other criminal activities that
are unrelated to auto theft. These groups are focused, on profit and quick
cash. The vehicle syndicates are often run by a few people with shared
interest in stealing and selling vehicle parts or the entire vehicle. Theft rings
are organised and they steal and dismantle a vehicle in a secure building
simply known as a “chop-shop” and sell the parts to willing buyers (Wallace,
2004:9). Mattheus et al. (2001:4) posits that most professional theft is
committed by syndicates.
Syndicates are organised groups who steal motor vehicles to either flee from
a crime scene especially a robbery scene, or they steal motor vehicles in
order to resell them. They also steal vehicles as a means of exchange in drug
trafficking. Because of the high levels of organisation, they can steal and sell a
car as a whole or sell the car parts and bodyworks to chop-shops in efficient,
rapid time (Mattheus et al., 2001:5).
While perusing the Case Administration System between 2005 and 2011, it
was evident that military vehicles are stolen almost every week at Thaba
Tshwane, some are stolen inside units while some are stolen around the
Thaba Tshwane shopping centre. On Tuesdays and Thursdays soldiers
complete a Concurrent Health Assessment (CHA) at Thaba Tshwane CHA
centre just metres from Thaba Tshwane shopping centre. There are many
SANDF vehicles stolen at the CHA centre and Thaba Tshwane shopping
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centre. For instance on 26 June 2009, Volkswagen city golf was stolen whilst
parked at Thaba Tshwane shopping centre. The two soldiers parked the
vehicle and went inside the shopping centre and when they returned they saw
a man of between 18 and 25 years of age inside the vehicle and when they
approached him he drove off with the vehicle. The vehicle was not recovered
(Case Administration System, 2009). On 08 July 2009, another vehicle a white
Mazda 323 was stolen at the Thaba Tshwane CHA centre. The theft of
SANDF vehicles at Thaba Tshwane suggest that there is a syndicate that
targets military vehicles around Thaba Tshwane shopping centre and the CHA
centre.
The researcher’s view is that the same syndicate is involved in the theft of
military vehicles inside units/bases. Normally vehicles stolen from units/bases
are stolen by using a duplicate set of keys. According to the investigating
officer at Thaba Tshwane, there are more than 3000 cases of this nature, and
85 percent of these cases are motor vehicle theft cases, concentrating only on
the theft of military vehicles in Thaba Tshwane. Johannesburg does not have
many military bases and therefore there are few military vehicles parked in the
immediate surroundings, and that could be the reason that less military
vehicles are stolen there.
3.4.3 Acquisitive motor vehicle theft
Acquisitive crime implies obtaining property through illegal means (Crime,
disorder and drugs, 2004:14). According to the Community Safety and Drugs
Partnership (2004:66), acquisitive theft implies obtaining property through
illegal means such as theft, robbery and etcetera. Devery (1993:24) agreed
that acquisitive theft involves thieves who are well organised and gain
significant income from stealing motor vehicles. There are thieves who carry
out acquisitive theft on a part time basis and they gain varying degrees of
financial benefits, and there are also amateur thieves who might steal a
vehicle to obtain parts for their own use.
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In 2006 a military vehicle (Volkswagen Jetta) was stolen at Waterkloof military
base, a key was used to steal the vehicle. After a few weeks the vehicle was
recovered in Kempton Park stripped of its parts. While, some parts were also
recovered, the majority of the parts were not. The suspect was a soldier who
worked at the Waterkloof military base. The suspect was acquitted due to
technical reasons that were overlooked by the military police during
investigation (Case Administration System, 2006).
3.5 MODUS OPERANDI
According to Mattheus et al. (2001:15) modus operandi is a Latin term that
refers to methodology, and a unique pattern that a criminal follows when
committing an offence. The meaning of modus operandi according to The
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual (2011) further defined modus operandi as the
“method of operating”, which in a criminal context can be easily used to
identify a culprit based on a characteristic pattern of methods of repeated
criminal act. Technology has advanced in the recent years since many
vehicles especially the new models are already installed with security devices
aimed at making it difficult for thieves to steal such vehicles. Vehicles are
stolen by thieves using different modus operandi. SANDF vehicles are
generally stolen like any other vehicle because they are not different to any
vehicle in South Africa and they drive on the same road.
The Provost Marshal General (2007:6) said that SANDF vehicles are   easily
accessible and the types of vehicles stolen are in high demand. He further
mentioned that the theft of motor vehicles in the SANDF is syndicate related
and they only target those vehicles that are in demand. He also suggested
that in most cases SANDF vehicles that are stolen from the unit or base are
as a result of assistance from a person who works at the transport section
(“finger man”) or a driver (Provost Marshal General (PMG), 2007:7). Typically,
it can be hypothesised that the “finger man” will make duplicates of the sets of
the spare keys that are kept at the transport section office. He will then hand
over the duplicate keys to the driver responsible for stealing the vehicle. A
possibility that the unit or base guards could be part of the syndicate is always
there.
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Normally the theft of SANDF vehicles occurs over weekends, public holidays
and after-hours according to the Provost Marshal General (PMG). Either the
“finger man” from the transport section or the driver of the vehicle drives the
vehicle out of the unit just before the weekend commences (Provost Marshal
General, 2007:7). The driver may or may not be involved in the theft. The
syndicate is then provided with sets of keys by the “finger man” to make sets
of duplicate keys. The syndicate will monitor the movement of a particular
vehicle (driver not involved) that they want to steal. Once the driver parks the
vehicle, they will then steal it (Provost Marshal General, 2007:7).
If the driver is involved, the driver will produce his set of keys and clearly
stated that he indeed locked the vehicle whilst he was conducting his duties. It
is also very easy for the driver to contact the syndicate and inform them
exactly where he will park the vehicle for them to steal it. When he returns,
obviously the vehicle will be gone and; he will report the vehicle as stolen
(Provost Marshal General, 2007:7).
According to the Military Police Division reported cases between 2005 and
2011, 86 military vehicles were stolen in Gauteng alone and out of the 86
vehicles stolen; 11 were stolen by the use of a duplicate key. As reflected in
Table 3.1, there are records of SANDF vehicles stolen for each day of the
week. During the past five years (2005 - 2010) most military vehicles (22
military vehicles to be precise) were stolen on Fridays in Gauteng alone and
most of these vehicles were stolen in Pretoria.
In Arizona, in the United States of America, individual thieves have acquired
some skills of unlocking vehicles using a device called a “slim jim”. This
device is used to unlock motor vehicles doors according to Arizona Auto Theft
Study (2004:9). Sometimes thieves are able to gain access to a car when the
owner does not properly secure their vehicles often leaving the keys in the
ignition or the vehicle left running. On 15 January 2005 a military vehicle was
stolen in Mamelodi whereby the driver left the vehicle unlocked with the key in
the ignition (Military Police Reported Cases from 2005/2010).
From 2005 to 2010, 48 military vehicles were stolen by the use of a device
similar to “slim jim” to open the vehicle doors but the name of the device in
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most of the cases remains unknown. In some instances thieves gain access
to a vehicle by breaking a window or use other means to force open the door.
Once they are inside the vehicle they hot-wire the car to start, a trick
especially useful with the older car models. Normally thieves crack the
steering column and remove the ignition to allow the vehicle to be started and
then they drive away. There are rare instances where a military vehicle has
been broken into by implementing this process. In 2010 only 1 military vehicle
was stolen, whereby a side window was broken (Military Police Reported
Cases from 2005/2010). According to Wallace (2003:5), motor vehicles are
stolen in Canada through the use of vehicle identification number (VIN)
switching. This is regarded as organised crime in Canada.
Thieves purchase a wrecked vehicle in order to retrieve of its status and VIN.
Their next action is to steal the same model of the car and then place the VIN
from the wrecked vehicle onto the stolen vehicle. The vehicle would then be
sold generally to someone in another province as a legitimate vehicle. Lyons
and Teigen (2008:10) stated that thieves use another method called motor
vehicle “cloning”. Cloning occurs when thieves copy a VIN of a legally owned
documented vehicle, and normally they target vehicles that are parked in a
parking lot or vehicle dealership’s lot. They use an illegally obtained VIN to
make counterfeit tags. This method is similar to the one outlined by Wallace
(2003:5) but in this instance, thieves then steal a similar vehicle in terms of
make and model and replace the VIN with the counterfeit tag.
Once this process is complete, the vehicle is considered to be a “clone” and
the vehicle can be easily sold without detection. Another method of
committing vehicle “cloning” according to Quinn (n.d.) is when offenders target
a vehicle that they would like to steal, retrieve the vehicles’ VIN number and
then visits a car dealership to request that new keys be made, since he/she
has lost the car’s keys. Normally this process is easier when there is a person
that works hand-in-hand with the offender or a syndicate at the actual
dealership. From 2005 to 2010, 40 military vehicles were stolen whilst parked
inside units/bases, and in the same period (2005 - 2010) 19 military vehicles
were stolen whilst parked along the streets in the Pretoria Central Business
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District (CBD) and the Johannesburg CBD, even though most of these
vehicles were stolen in Pretoria (Military Police Division Cases Reported from
2005 - 2010). Thieves also steal motor vehicles by using force, the threat of
violence or weapons and this type of motor vehicle theft is called carjacking.
(Arizona Auto Theft Study, 2004:67). The study stated that carjacking does
not include auto theft crime because it can be classified as either an armed or
strong armed robbery. Between 2007 and 2008 only two military vehicles
were stolen by the use of force in Gauteng. The statistics demonstrate that
there are very few military vehicles that are stolen by force (Military Police
Division Cases Reported from 2005 to 2011). Table 3.3 displays the types of
military vehicles that were stolen during 2005 and 2010 in Gauteng:
Year Type of vehicle Make Number of vehicle
stolen
2005 1 x Sedan
1 x 16 Seater bus
1 x Sedan
6 x Unknown
Toyota
unknown
Ford
Unknown
2
1
1
6
2006 No data No data No data
2007 1 x Sedan
4 x Bakkie
1 x 16 Seater bus
1 x Sedan
1 x Bakkie
2 x Bakkie
1 x Sedan
2 x Sedans
1 x Sedan
1 x Bakkie
2 x Sedans
2 x Sedans
1 x 16 Seater bus
4 x Unknown
Toyota
Unknown
Unknown
Mazda
Isuzu
Nissan
unknown
Fiat
Opel
Colt
Volkswagen
Ford
Unknown
Unknown
1
4
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
4
2008 3 x 16 Seater Bus
3 x Sedans
2 x Bakkies
1 x Sedan
1 x Sedan
1 x Bakkie
1 x Sedan
1 x Bakkie
1 x Sedan
9 x Unknown
Toyota
Unknown
unknown
Fiat
Isuzu
Open
Mazda
Nissan
Unknown
Unknown
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
2009 1 x Bakkie
2 x Sedans
1 x Sedan
1 x Bakkie
2 x Unknown
Toyota
Volkswagen
Nissan
Unknown
Unknown
1
2
2
1
2
2010 4 x Sedans
1 x 16 Seater Bus
1 x Bakkie
1 x Bakkie
1 x Sedan
1 x Sedan
4 x Sedans
3 x Sedans
4 x Unknown
Toyota
Unknown
Unknown
Nissan
Unknown
Honda
Mazda
Fiat
Unknown
4
1
1
2
1
1
4
3
4
Table 3.3: The types and make of vehicles stolen in the SANDF in Gauteng in the last five
years (2005 - 2010). (SANDF. Military Police Division Cases Reported from 2005 – 2011)
37
3.6 THE EXTENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT IN THE SANDF
Crime estimates can play a significant role in helping an organisation to
achieve the greatest impact against crime concerning the amount of money
allocated and spent from an organisation’s budget (Brand & Price, 2000). It is
the researcher’s opinion that the SANDF has lost millions if not billions of
Rands in theft of vehicles alone, hampering the effectiveness of the
organisation. The Provost Marshal General (2007:1) once said that the
Department of Defence invested millions of rands into the SANDF so that its
members could deliver a professional service but the escalation in crime such
as corruption, theft, fraud and other crimes, the SANDF finds it difficult to
achieve its goal.
Table 3.4 displays motor vehicles that were stolen from the SANDF in
Gauteng Province from 2005 to 2010 and the estimated monetary value
incurred as losses by the SANDF. The table depicts the type of vehicles
stolen and the monetary values of the stolen vehicles.
VEHICLE TYPE NUMBER OF
VEHICLES
STOLEN
RECOVERED VALUE OF
VEHICLES IN RANDS
Passenger
vehicles
14 1 R3, 900.000
Sedan 29 0 R4, 640.000
Bakkie 19 0 R3,420.000
Unknown 24 0 R2, 400.000
Total 86 1 R14, 360.000
Table 3.4: Motor vehicles that were stolen in Gauteng Province from 2005 – 2010 and the
monetary value incurred by the SANDF (SANDF. Military Police Division Cases Reported
from 2005 – 2011).
Table 3.5 confirms the exact places where military vehicles were stolen. The
table also reveals that 40 military vehicles were stolen from units/bases
between 2005 to 2010 and this might suggest that security measures are not
up to standard in most military bases in Gauteng. Fourteen military vehicles
were stolen in Central Business Districts (CBD) of Pretoria, Johannesburg and
38
other small towns of Gauteng. Nineteen military vehicles were stolen in the
suburbs of Gauteng and four were stolen in shopping centres in Gauteng. The
location of two military vehicles where they were stolen remains unknown
(Military Police Division Cases Reported from 2005 to 2010).
Year Place where vehicles were stolen Number of
vehicles stolen
2005 Base/Unit 5
CBD 2
Suburb 3
Shopping centre 0
Unknown 0
2006 No data No data
2007 Base/Unit 10
CBD 3
Suburb 9
Shopping centre 2
Unknown 0
2008 Base/Unit 12
CBD 2
Suburb 8
Shopping centre 1
Unknown 0
2009 Base/Unit 5
CBD 0
Suburb 3
Shopping centre 0
Unknown 0
2010 Base/Unit 8
CBD 7
Suburb 3
Shopping centre 1
Unknown 2
Table 3.5: The exact places where military vehicle were stolen (SANDF. Military Police
Division Cases Reported from 2005 to 2011)
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3.7 CONCLUSION
The mission of the Department of Defence is to defend and protect South
Africa, its territorial integrity and its people (National Crime Prevention
Strategy, May 1996). It is obvious that the theft of military vehicles and other
SANDF resources renders the SANDF unproductive and makes the
realisation of the organisation’s mission to defend and protect South Africa,
its’ territory and its people impossible. It is regarded by most people as
unacceptable that 86 military vehicles were stolen in Gauteng alone,
especially because most of the vehicles were stolen inside military bases or
units. The involvement of SANDF members in criminal activities is of great
concern, as these soldiers target SANDF institutions by committing the crime
of stealing military vehicles either as individuals or as part of syndicates
(Provost Marshal General, 2007:2).
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CHAPTER 4: SECURITY STATUS OF SANDF VEHICLES IN THE
GAUTENG PROVINCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The theft of SANDF property compelled the Department of Defence’s Foreign
Relations Division (DFR) to update and issue the vehicle control instruction to
enhance the control of official vehicles (Department of Defence Annual
Report, 2007/2008:85). The former Provost Marshal General (2007:6)
explained that SANDF vehicles are in high demand and are easily accessible.
His reasoning was based on the fact that there are no strict control measures
enforced to ensure that vehicles are safe and secure at all times. Although
there are some control measures on paper, commanders are too lenient to
enforce them; those on paper are not good enough to curb the scourge of
military vehicle theft.
The Department of Defence (DOD) Anti-Criminality Code was established in
order to deal with all matters related to crime management. However, there
have been few positive results. It is apparent that nothing seems to work in
preventing crime and more especially the theft of military vehicles. Crime
prevention remains the responsibility of all members of the Department of
Defence both uniform and civilian members. The DOD Anti-Criminality section
cannot be effective unless all parties commit themselves to fighting crime by
tacitly ensuring that all DOD assets are secured, especially military vehicles.
4.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
4.2.1 Military Police Official
Military Police Official refers to a member of the SANDF appointed in terms of
Section 30 of the Defence Act, 42 of 2002.
4.2.2 Stable authority
A stabling authority refers to a process that authorises a member of the
Department of Defence (DOD) to stable a DOD vehicle at his/her residence.
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This authority must be the exception to the rule and can only be granted for
the specific task/duty. A stabling authority is also applicable to members
whose residence is situated within a Force Structure Element (FSE) security
area (Log 14 pamphlet, n.d.).
4.2.3 Trip authority
A trip authority is a document that is completed by a driver before an authority
can be granted to him/her to drive a military vehicle.
4.3 THE CURRENT STATUS OF GARAGING VEHICLES
4.3.1 Garaging within the unit
Evidence suggests that there are guidelines on where vehicles should be kept
within unit lines during and after hours although due to the dilapidated state of
buildings, it becomes difficult to accommodate all vehicles within lock-up
facilities. All military units/bases have places called transport parks and
military vehicles are supposed to be kept in these spaces, especially when
that particular vehicle is not in use or over weekends and public holidays.
Transport parks are always under the supervision of an officer, and the officer
has members who report directly to him and they help with the administration
of the vehicles under their control. Their administration duties include
arranging for the servicing of vehicles, renewal of trip authorities and stabling
authorities.
The process for garaging military vehicles, differs from one unit to another,
since some units store their vehicles inside ‘hangars’ and some units have car
ports and still others units are not better resourced in terms of facilities and
therefore vehicles are parked in front of offices over weekends and public
holidays. A ‘hangar’ is generally a big shelter built with corrugated iron that
can accommodate up to 20 military vehicles, including armoured vehicles
(own definition).
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‘Hangars’ are better suited at military bases because these keep vehicles out
of sight all the time. However, not all units have ‘hangars’. The transport parks
in most units do not have adequate parking spaces for all the military vehicles
under their control, as a unit have steadily acquired more vehicles from 2005
to 2010. Approximately ten years ago, medium and large units would have
between 10 and 20 vehicles, but currently these same units have 30 to 40
vehicles per unit. Nonetheless, it remains important that all military vehicles
must be parked within a safe and secured environment at all times.
Based on observation and personal experience all SANDF units are under
strict protection at all times, which is provided by soldiers armed with rifles (at
most units). In most cases members from the infantry corps provide protection
in the DOD. The Military Police Agency (MPA) Instruction 07 of 1999 stated
that in order to maintain law and order and a high standard of discipline in a
particular service, no member attached to the MPA will be used for tasks that
are not directly linked with the Military Police function.
Military Police Agency personnel will not be utilised for the following: (a) The
patrolling and maintenance of security fences, (b) Entry control, (c) Control
over Regimental Police, and (d) Members of Board of Investigations,
Preliminary Investigations, senior officer off duty, duty officers/Non
Commissioned Officers, except with regard to the MP Office's operations.
Therefore military police members are not allowed to stand guard or to do
guard duties at other units / bases other than their base(s). However, a
military police station is not treated like a unit where there are guards at the
gate since there is a client service centre which is manned 24 hours a day.
4.3.2 Private garages (at home)
In terms of the Log 14 pamphlet (n.d.) DOD vehicles must be garaged in a
securely locked garage or parked in a fenced-off private property, of which the
gate must be locked and the vehicle be parked out of sight.
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In terms of the Log 14 Pamphlet (n.d.), the driver must take every reasonable
precaution to discourage and/or prevent theft. The above-mentioned condition
does not apply to flats, which do not have garage facilities. Military vehicles
may only be garaged at a complex where lock-up garages are available.
According to the Department of Defence Instruction 02 (1998:3) members
may only be allowed to take military vehicles home only in exceptional cases,
whereby a member must perform early or late duty. The fact remains that
there are members of the SANDF that drive military vehicles on a daily basis,
without having to perform an early or late duty.
Before a driver can take a military vehicle home with him, a director/supervisor
of his Service/Division must certify by signature that the driver qualifies all the
requirements on a form called a stable authority. On the stable authority form
the driver is required to describe in writing the nature of the duty that requires
him to have a military vehicle. The driver also certifies that he has a lock-up
garage/facility where the vehicle will be kept once the driver has arrived home.
A lock-up facility refers to a complex where there is preferably security guards
controlling vehicle access at the gate. The driver must certify that the military
vehicle will be garaged at one of the following locations during the day,
overnight, over weekends and public holidays: (a) within a SANDF security
area, (b) within fenced and guarded plots or terrain and, (c) inside a garage
that can be securely locked (Log 14 pamphlet, n.d.). If a driver does not have
a garage at home but he resides next to a military base or a South African
Police (SAP) station, he can park the vehicle inside the military unit/base or
inside the police station. It is the responsibility of the driver to inform the duty
room personnel at the military base/unit or SAP station about the vehicle.
Should the driver not have access to either of the above-mentioned garaging
options, the authority cannot be granted for him to drive a military vehicle
home.The problem here is that in most cases drivers provide the incorrect
information about places where a vehicle will be kept, because they that they
know that commanders will not do or send someone to physically confirm
whether he qualifies for all the requirements before an authority could be
granted.
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4.3.3 Public places
According to the Log 14 pamphlet (n.d.) military vehicles cannot be parked
along unattended streets. Preferably vehicles must be parked in secured
parking areas where there are guards. The driver responsible will be the one
to settle the parking bill for the vehicle. A public place means any other place
other than a military base/unit, for example, within the CBD, built-up areas,
suburbia, shopping centres, and the like. According a document titled Duties
and Responsibilities of SANDF Vehicle Drivers (1997:8) members visiting
urban areas such as the Finance Office or Bank of Lisbon in the Pretoria CBD
are not allowed to park vehicles in the streets. However, this is perplexing for
the drivers, as there is absolutely no parking for outstation vehicles at either
premises.
Many vehicles were stolen from public places especially in Pretoria. There are
four places that are problematic for military drivers in the Pretoria CBD that
include the Army Headquarters (Dequar Road), Air Force Headquarters
(Dequar Road), Poyntons Building (Corner Bosman and WF Nkomo streets,
where Chief Finance is and Foreign allowance are obtained) and the Bank of
Lisbon (Corner Paul Kruger and Visagie streets where Human Resource
Centre is housed). Military drivers from all over South Africa are sent to these
two buildings for administration duties. The main challenge that has existed
existence for many years (based on observation and experience) is that there
is absolutely no secured parking available for military vehicles visiting the
buildings other than the vehicles that are on the strength of the above
mentioned directorates. Even members working in both buildings do not have
parking for their private vehicles inside the premises except for the high
ranking officials such as Generals.
Drivers are forced to park vehicles in the street and in most cases the vehicles
are left unattended, rendering them easy targets. The Log 14 pamphlet (n.d.)
makes provision for drivers to leave military vehicles unattended when
delivering goods or documents (provided he/she is alone) or when a driver is
ordered to do so by a duly authorised person. Therefore the security of
military vehicles is somehow compromised.
45
SANDF documentation (Duties and responsibilities of SANDF vehicle Drivers,
1997:3) further mentioned that a driver is not permitted to leave a vehicle
unattended except (1) when it is an empty cargo vehicle, (2) when the vehicle
and cargo can be locked up, (3) when in exceptional circumstances, (4) when
delivering goods or documents, (5) if so ordered by a duly authorised person,
(6) if the driver has a good reason thereto and necessary precautions have
been taken and (7) when a vehicle is left unattended, the vehicle trip authority
and the ignition key are to be removed. The security of military vehicles is
inconsistent and is not taken seriously.
4.4 CURRENT STATUS OF SANDF VEHICLE SECURITY
As part of security measures within the SANDF, there is a document called a
trip authority which is renewable every Monday (expires after seven days) at
the transport park. Every military unit/base got a transport park where all unit /
base vehicles are controlled. A trip authority is part of a system aimed at
controlling the movements of military vehicles because no vehicle is allowed
to drive out of a unit without a valid trip authority. A trip authority has an
attachment called a log book where a driver is supposed to complete it from
one point to another and after seven days, he/she will add all the kilometres
travelled together and close the trip authority before acquiring a new one.
According to the Department of Defence’s Annual Report (2010/2011:136),
the SANDF vehicle fleet is also safeguarded through the use of non-
removable stickers in order to make them easily identifiable. Some vehicles
are monitored by Defence Intelligence or the respective service or division
through the tracking system. Although in practice, there are few vehicles that
are safeguarded through the use of stickers, the majority of vehicles do not
have stickers, meaning they can only be identified by their registration
numbers. Again there are few vehicles that are monitored by Defence
Intelligence (DI), which could be because DI is only able to monitor vehicles
that belong to them (DI). Some vehicles especially those that were bought
after 2005 are fitted with factory immobilisers, gear locks and central lock
systems.
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According to section 34 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002, the purpose of
Defence Intelligence is to ensure national security; assist in the formulation of
defense policy; assist in the determination of defense strategy; assist in the
execution of and defence of national and foreign policy; ensure the security of
defense assets of whatever description; and assist in the co-ordination of
foreign military assistance. The problem is that Defence Intelligence does not
have the mandate to arrest, so if a military vehicle is stolen and the tracking
system is monitored by Defence Intelligence, they can alert the Military Police
or the SAPS to commence a search for the vehicle, but they cannot personally
arrest the perpetrators if found.
There are also other military vehicles that have provincial registration numbers
because of their involvement in clandestine operations and those vehicles are
vulnerable to misuse, which subsequently lead to theft since they cannot be
differentiated from any civilian vehicle. These vehicles are used by Defence
Intelligence members, Military Police Intelligence, Military Police Special
Investigation Branch and Military Police Internal Investigations. The only
control mechanism that commanders rely on is the trip authority that checks
their members’ trip authorities after each and every trip, especially after
weekends. Since Defence Intelligence has the capability of installing the
tracker system, they are able to monitor their own vehicles.
4.4.1 Locks
Locks are used to lock up unit/base gates, ‘hangars’ and transport park gates
so that unauthorised people do not have access. The problem is the access
control of keys since there are no strong measures in place in most SANDF
units. During public holidays and weekends all unit keys are kept in the duty
room (based on observation and personal experience) and the officer on duty
will be in control of the keys and in his/her absence the next higher rank will
be in charge. Statistics have shown that most military vehicles in Gauteng
were stolen from units on weekends and public holidays. The fact that some
members report for duty under the influence of alcohol is attributed to the theft
of military vehicles, since such members cannot perform their duties diligently.
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On more than one occasion, the key to the safe has been found hanging
around in plain sight, creating an opportunity for would-be thieves.
4.4.2 Central lock system
According to the researchers’ observations, most of the new military vehicles
(bought after 2005) have factory installed central lock systems. The old
vehicles do not have central lock systems and therefore these are vulnerable
to theft. Even those that have factory installed central lock systems are not
immune to theft since most of them were stolen using keys, especially
duplicate keys.
4.4.3 Gear lock
A gear lock is used effectively on the side of the console. The internal pin is
manufactured from tempered steel. A gear lock is a highly effective anti-theft
device, which prevents the gear-shifter from moving once in the locking
position. A gear lock bolts the gear stick movement of a car, thus making it
difficult to shift gears as in the case of theft. According to the researcher’s
observations, most of the new vehicles have factory installed gear locks that
are locked by pressing down the lock button and to unlock it a key has to be
used. The old vehicles do not have factory installed gear locks. While
transport officers were supposed to procure gear locks to protect these older
vehicles, it has never happened, rendering these vehicles an easy target for
motor vehicle thieves.
4.4.4 Geographical position system (GPS)
The researcher has observed the development and procurement of the GPS
system since 1996, as an employee at the SANDF. Military vehicles that were
purchased between 2005 and 2010 do not have built in Global Positioning
Systems (GPS), therefore Services and Divisions had to purchase GPS for
vehicles under their control but it has that not happened to most of them.
Vehicles that were bought in 2011 had built in GPS, most notably the Renault
Meganes that were bought by the Military Police Division and few other
Services and Divisions.
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A GPS makes it easier for a driver to find a specific place, instead of driving
around asking people for directions or relying on a map book, thereby
exposing themselves to unnecessary hijackings.
4.5 COSTS VERSUS SAVINGS
There were approximately 92 military vehicles that were stolen (2006 statistics
are unavailable) in Gauteng from 2005 to 2011 and the monetary value of
these vehicles is approximately R 16, 234 million. These vehicles were stolen
from units/bases, streets, private homes and central business district (CBD).
Most vehicles were stolen from units/bases. But the question would be what to
do to salvage the situation?
During an interview with an officer from Defence Intelligence (identity
withheld) who is also a project officer for the installation of tracking devices on
SANDF vehicles, he said there is a motor vehicle tracking company that has
been contracted to install tracking devices on SANDF vehicles. He further said
that the installation and monthly premiums will be budgeted for by the
respective Services and Divisions. According to their figures it costs R2 500 to
install a tracking system on one vehicle, irrespective of the model or make,
and the monthly premium is R50 per vehicle (R50 x 12 = R600). The SANDF
(only in Gauteng) suffered a loss of about R14, 360.000 (See table 3.4) due to
vehicle theft. If these vehicles were installed with tracking systems earlier the
loss could have been averted and the SANDF could have saved millions of
rands incurred due to vehicle theft.
4.6 THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE IN CRIME PREVENTION
In terms of Section 31 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002, a Military Police
member has the same powers, functions and duties as a member of the
South African Police Service. For the purpose of enforcing the Defence Act or
any other law including the common law in so far as it applies to the
Department of Defence, any member, employee or property of the
Department of Defence, to any person, area, land, premises or property under
the protection or control of the Department of Defence, a military police official
may at any time and in any place perform any police function, which includes:
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the prevention and combating of crime, the investigation of any offence or
alleged offence; and the maintenance of law and order. Military Police provide
a military policing capability to the Department of Defence (DOD Annual
Report, 2008/9:125).The Military Police (MP) Division has achieved most of its
objectives successfully, despite structural challenges and budget constraints.
In striving towards a crime-free military environment, the MP Division involved
Services and Divisions in crime-combating exercises and established an anti-
criminality capability to orchestrate the management of crime in the
DOD(Department of Defence Annual Report, 2010/11:136).
The Chief of the MP Division, the Provost Marshal General (PMG), had
bilateral talks with Chiefs of Services and Divisions on a continuous basis to
discuss challenges in respect of crime within their areas of responsibility, and
provided advice during these meetings. Provision has been made in the
Defence Review Update of 2007 for a Safeguarding Board. The Safeguarding
Board was successfully established in the DOD and met monthly.
Furthermore the Nodal Point on Anti-Criminality was established at the MP
Division Headquarters (Pretoria). Instructions were subsequently issued to
Services and Divisions to establish their respective nodal points for the
prevention and combating of crime. These nodal points were successfully
established and provide monthly crime management information and reports
at the Safeguarding Board. The newly-established Protection and Security
Section at the MP Division HQ assisted Services and Divisions in conducting
crime risk surveys (Department of Defence Annual Report, 2007/8:174).
4.7 CHALLENGES
There were approximately (due to the unavailability of 2006 statistics) 92
military vehicles that were stolen in Gauteng from 2005 to 2011. All the
vehicles that were stolen were not installed with tracking devices otherwise
they could have been recovered easily. Thirty nine of the stolen vehicles were
taken from military units/bases where there are guards at the gates 24 hours a
day. This raises concerns regarding whether the guards are not maybe the
ones arranging the theft of the vehicles.
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For instance on 18 April 2008 a Toyota 16-seater bus (case number withheld)
was stolen from the South African Air Force Gymnasium. The question would
be where were the guards when the vehicle was stolen? On 27 June 2007 a
Ford sedan was stolen (case number withheld) whilst parked outside the duty
room of the General Support Base (GSB) Garrison in Thaba Tshwane. There
are guards at these areas at all times and the whereabouts have to be
questioned, when the vehicle was stolen.
SANDF VEHICLES STOLEN IN GAUTENG FROM 2005 – 2011
STOLEN FROM 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL
UNITS / BASES 5 - 12 8 5 6 3 39
PUBLIC 0 - 4 6 1 6 0 17
CBD 2 - 1 0 0 5 4 12
PRIVATE /
HOMES 2 - 3 6 2 1 0
14
UNKNOWN 1 - 3 2 0 2 2 10
TOTAL 10 - 23 22 8 20 9 92
Table 4.1: SANDF vehicles stolen in Gauteng from 2005 – 2011 and places where they were
stolen (SANDF. Military Police Division Cases Reported from 2005 – 2011).
Seventeen vehicles were stolen at public places, meaning that these vehicles
were stolen whilst parked along the street in public places unattended. The
Log 14 pamphlet states clearly that a military vehicle cannot be left
unattended in case it is parked in an unsecured area. On 28 February 2008,
an Isuzu bakkie was stolen (CAS 2008/02/34) whilst parked outside the Thaba
Tshwane shopping complex. The driver left the vehicle unattended and went
inside the complex to do some shopping and when he returned the vehicle
was long gone. The military police are supposed to do patrols and when they
see a military vehicle parked in a public place, they should then take
disciplinary actions against the driver, but they (military police) are thin on the
ground due to structural challenges. This is also part of the problem. The 14
military vehicles that were stolen in private places0 or at homes suggest that
drivers never provided correct information about parking facilities at their
homes when completing the stabling authority, despite the fact that the Log 14
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pamphlet clearly states that a commander or a transport officer must do an
inspection to ensure that indeed the member (driver) has a garage or a lock-
up facility where the vehicle will be parked before signing the members’
authority to take a vehicle home. On 01 November 2008 a Toyota sedan was
stolen (case number withheld) at Thaba Tshwane whilst parked outside a
garage instead of being parked inside a garage. The military vehicle was
stolen due to negligence on the side of the driver because he had a choice of
parking the vehicle at the nearest military base and instead drove home with
his car. For example:
‘I was allocated a military vehicle in 2009 and knowing that I had no
secured parking, I would drive from home to Dequar Military Police
Station where I would leave my car (private car) and drove the military
vehicle to work, and coming back from work I would go through the
same process. By so doing the military vehicle was always safe’ (the
researcher’s personal experience).
The fact is that some of the vehicles are stolen as a result of pure negligence
and a contributing factor is that drivers know that there are means of
monitoring the military vehicles such as tracking devices. According to the Log
14 pamphlet (n.d.) if a driver does not reside near a military base he/she can
park the military vehicle at the nearest South African Police Service station but
the SANDF drivers do not adhere to policies and instructions. There are three
hundred and thirty nine (339) military policemen and women in Gauteng
currently. Out of the 339 military police members, there are those that are not
directly involved in crime prevention activities such as: the client service
centre personnel, Case Management System (CAS) members, detention
barrack members, and those who do the day-to-day unit administration. There
are also sections like police intelligence, special investigation branch, and
internal investigation sections that do not necessarily take part in crime
prevention activities. Some of the members out of the 339 are deployed both
internally to man South Africa’s boarders and externally for peace-
keeping/enforcement Missions in Africa (under the African Union and United
Nations organisations respectively) and some are sent to complete courses
whilst some take part in some of the SANDF exercises such as Exercise
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Seboka, Young Eagle, and the like. Gauteng has the highest number of
military personnel when compared to any other province in the country. All the
Services/Divisions headquarters are in Gauteng. Headquarters for the 4 arms
of Service such as the South African Navy (SAN) Headquarters, the South
Military Health Services (SAHMS), South African Army, and South African Air
Force are all in Pretoria. Again the headquarters for all the Divisions such as
the DOD Intelligence, Military Police, Command and Management Information
System are also in Pretoria. There are approximately 6000 soldiers working in
Pretoria; therefore military police members are thin on the ground.
As mentioned in the DOD Annual Report, (2010/11:92) the military police
have done well despite structural challenges and budget constraints. There
are many vacant posts within the Military Police Division but these are
unfunded. Even if the structural challenges could be overcome, another
challenge is the shortage of military accommodation in Pretoria where the
majority of soldiers work. So creating more posts for the military police in
Gauteng would not necessarily solve the crime problem, especially motor
vehicle theft.
Most drivers have only heard of a Log 14 pamphlet or any other instruction
related to duties and responsibilities of a driver when they were doing their
driving and maintenance course at the time of employment. For some, this
could be as long as 15 years ago. The researcher believes that drivers have
to be reminded in a form of refresher courses. Furthermore the DOD
instructions and policies on the management of vehicles have to be reviewed
annually so that they are in line with the National Traffic Regulations. Another
challenge is that there is no centralised DOD licence centre and as a result
anyone can issue a licence and most Human Resource clerks can capture
that licence into the system.
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4.8 CONCLUSION
The current security status of SANDF vehicles is poor, and only recently have
tracking devices been installed on vehicles. Vehicles that were procured prior
to 2010, are rendered vulnerable to theft. To rely on factory or original vehicle
security devices is not enough, since thieves are able to bypass such security
devices. SANDF bases/units are inadequately protected, that is why some
vehicles were stolen from the units/bases. It does not necessarily help to
install the best access control systems when the members managing the
access points do not have the interest of the organisation at heart. In as
much, the guard system is ineffective because at most units/bases, the
guards do not believe that their jobs are of value. The SANDF needs to
analyse other security mechanisms instead of solely relying on the guards to
maintain safe and secure units/bases.
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The reason for conducting this research was to sensitise the leadership in the
South African National Defense Force (SANDF) especially the Chiefs of
Service and Divisions as decision makers with regards to theft of military
vehicles at Gauteng. The research paper focussed mainly on the existing
preventative measures and the role of military police in the prevention and
investigation of theft of military vehicles. The researcher intends to develop
guidelines related to the theft of military motor vehicles which will prevent
further theft while investigating the theft of military vehicles.
5.2 SPECIFIC FINDINGS
5.2.1 Factors contributing to vehicle theft in the SANDF
There are numerous factors that give rise to theft of SANDF vehicles in
Gauteng Province. The most common factors are the lack of general security
within the military bases/units and the lack of vehicle security. Most
bases/units do not have adequate control over the movement of both
personnel (especially visitors) and vehicles in and out of their bases/units and
this contributes to the theft of vehicles since these individuals gain easy
access to those particular bases/units daily routines (Provost Marshal
General, 2007:7).
The guard system that is currently employed by the SANDF is old and
ineffective since the old methods of registering incoming and outgoing
vehicles and personnel are still in use. In the researcher’s observation it
becomes difficult to trace a vehicle once it has been stolen because there is
no secure place where the registers are kept. Sometimes it is done
deliberately by the guards simply because they are involved (Provost Marshal
General, 2007:7). This statement is also supported by the sheer number of
military vehicles that were stolen from military bases/units between 2005 and
2011 in Gauteng (Military Police Motor vehicle theft statistics 2005 – 2011).
Even if there was a place where the registers are kept, it would take ages to
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peruse them. SANDF vehicles are stolen from bases/unit lines in the presence
of heavily armed guards and the recovery rate is almost zero. The trip
administration of military vehicle is primitive and unreliable; drivers renew their
trip authorities every Monday (valid for 7 days). When other motor vehicle
management systems of large organisations (such as the University of South
Africa (UNISA)) considered, it becomes evident that the SANDF’s system is
archaic. At UNISA for example, drivers do not have to complete point-to-point
trips (Beukman, 2013) because the system records every trip. At the SANDF
drivers know how to manipulate the system since it does not monitor the day-
to-day trips of a vehicle because the driver has to manually complete the log
book (trip-to-trip). As a result, there are vehicles that were stolen in places that
they were not supposed to be, such as at shopping malls during working
hours or, after hours, on weekends, and public holidays.
The SANDF does not have proper vehicle security measures that can protect
vehicles from being stolen, except the measures that have been recently
implemented in the form of motor vehicle tracking systems, according to the
Defence Intelligence vehicle tracking system project officer (identity withheld).
There were no other measures in place to prevent the theft of SANDF
vehicles from 2005 until 2011, owing to the dismal recovery rate of stolen
vehicles. If information about a stolen vehicle was provided by an eye witness
or an informer, the vehicle would likely be recovered.
There are many SANDF vehicles that were stolen from suburbs (Thaba
Tshwane, Mamelodi, Pretoria West) and Pretoria CBD and mainly these thefts
were as a result of lack of both vehicle security measures and the parking
facilities (Military Police motor vehicle crime statistics 2005-2011). For
instance, vehicles that were stolen while parked outside Bank of Lisbon (Paul
Kruger and Visagie streets) and Poyntons Building (Corner Bosman and WF
Nkomo streets).
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5.2.2 Stabling authority
A stabling authority authorises a member of the Department of Defence
(DOD) to stable a DOD vehicle at his/her residence. This authority must be
the exception to the rule and can only be granted for the specific task/duty. A
stabling authority is also applicable to members whose residence is situated
within a Force Structure Element (FSE) security area (Log 14 pamphlet, n.d.).
Therefore military vehicles are not to be parked or garaged at private
residences without a stabling authority.
The current method that is used when drivers have to drive home with a
military vehicle is ineffective and it contributed mainly to the vehicles that were
stolen from suburbs (Military Police motor vehicle theft statistics, 2005 - 2011).
Before a driver could drive a vehicle home, he/she should have to manually
complete a form confirming that the vehicle will be parked (overnight) in a
lock-up garage. It is the responsibility of the commander to confirm that the
particular driver indeed has access to those facilities. These confirmations
seldom happen, resulting in SANDF vehicles that are parked outside and thus
rendering them easy targets to thieves.
5.2.3 Modus operandi
Mattheus et al. (2002:12), defined modus operandi as a behaviour, conduct or
operational methodology. There are various modus operandi that were used
by thieves to steal SANDF vehicles. The use of a master key and vehicle
spare keys remains the two major factors that have contributed to most of
SANDF vehicles that were stolen from 2005 up to 2010 (Military Police vehicle
theft statistics 2005-2010). Surprisingly most of these vehicles were stolen
from inside military bases/units were there are guards all the time. Vehicle
spare keys are not properly secured, as most members of the SANDF can
access the keys relatively easily. Transport officers do not take full
responsibility for ensuring that vehicles are safeguarded and that vehicle keys
are kept in safe places where only the transport officer or his/her deputy have
access to the keys.
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The Provost Marshal General (2007:7) mentioned that normally there is a
“finger man” who supplies a set of keys to the thieves in order for them to
make duplicate keys and therefore makes it easier to steal the vehicles that
they target.
5.2.4 Tracking system monitored by Defence Intelligence
In terms of section 199 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108
of 1996, read with the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994, the
National Defence Force shall:
“subject to section 3- (a) gather, correlate, evaluate and use foreign
military intelligence, and supply foreign military intelligence relating to
national strategic intelligence to Nicoc, but the National Defence Force
shall not gather intelligence of a non-military nature in a covert manner;
(b) gather, correlate, evaluate and use domestic military intelligence
excluding covert collection, except when employed for service as
contemplated in section 201 (2) (a) of the Constitution and under
conditions set out in section 3 (2) of this Act, and supply such
intelligence to Nicoc; and [Para. (b) amended by s. 2 (e) of Act 37 of
1998.] (c) institute counter-intelligence measures within the National
Defence Force”.
The Defence Intelligence (DI) cannot collect intelligence information and make
arrests at the same time.  The Military Police are there to make arrests as
mandated by Section 30 of the Defence Act, Act 42 of 2002, the Defence Act
further states that the MP can at any time and in any place perform any police
function which includes the prevention and combating of crime, the
investigation of any offence or alleged offence and the maintenance of law
and order.
The current tracking system was introduced mid 2011 but most SANDF
Services and Divisions still did not install the system on their vehicles
(Defence Intelligence Project Officer, identity withheld). The tracking system is
fully monitored by Defence Intelligence (DI) according to the project officer.
During an interview with the officer on 12 April 2013, he said the tracking
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system is monitored by DI (situated in Pretoria) for all the SANDF vehicles all
over South Africa. Being the project officer, he said he is in charge of the
system. Essentially, whenever a vehicle is stolen, he is currently the only
person that can be contacted in order to track the whereabouts of that
particular vehicle. He then calls the Military Police and informs them where to
find the vehicle. He acknowledged that this is a time consuming exercise
because by the time he has contacted the MPs, the thieves are already busy
dismantling the vehicle. He further stated that in the future all services and
divisions will have to purchase the vehicle tracking software so that they are
able to monitor their own vehicles. Currently there is no member of the
SANDF that is monitoring vehicles on full time basis; the system is only
activated once a call is received about a stolen vehicle; other than that the
system runs in the background.
Almost two hours after the interview with the project officer concluded (on 12
April 2013), a report was received by the Military Police situated at the
Defence Headquarters that some armed men tried to steal a land cruiser
installed with the same tracking system at the Defence Headquarters visitors’
parking. The thieves knew exactly where to look for the device and they did
not have any difficulty in disconnecting it. They were interrupted by the military
driver when he returned to the vehicle only to find the men already inside the
vehicle, they ran away on foot and nobody was harmed. The Defence
Headquarters is supposed to have the highest security in the entire SANDF
but it is worrying when thieves target the premises.
This suggests that the current security measures are not effective at all. Under
normal circumstances when a tracking device is tampered with, it should
automatically transmit a message to the user, in this case to the project
manager that something was wrong. The project manager knew nothing about
the attempted theft of the vehicle until he was informed. This suggests that the
system is not monitored because the Military Police were informed by the
driver about the attempted theft, and the same Military Police did not attempt
to track down the thieves because they were only two at the station and they
were both without a vehicle.
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If the system cannot report thefts automatically, it suggests that it is not
proactive. If the thieves were not interrupted by the return of the military driver,
the vehicle would be gone, possibly without a trace. The project officer
mentioned two incidents of SANDF vehicle theft that took place in Pretoria
and both vehicles were installed with the tracking device. He said both
vehicles were recovered with minor damages.
5.2.5 Security of SANDF vehicles within military bases and units
SANDF vehicles are not properly secured within various bases/units. As a
result 39 vehicles were stolen between 2005 and 2011 from military
bases/units and this suggests that security of vehicles within bases/units is
insufficient (Military Police Motor vehicle theft statistics 2005 - 2011). Most
bases/units do not have adequate parking space for vehicles and that is
caused by dilapidated buildings and the increase in the number of vehicles
acquired over the years. Therefore vehicles are parked all over the unit
instead of being parked within secured parking facilities. The Provost Marshal
General (2007:7) said the vehicles that are stolen whilst parked in the
unit/base transport park are stolen with the help of a “finger man” or a person
that is drives the particular vehicle.
The SANDF security system at various entrances in Gauteng is ineffective.
Most entrances are manned by soldiers, and a person can enter a unit/base
and walk around freely without being asked by any individual to identify
him/herself. This statement is supported by the Provost Marshal General
(2007:7) when he said that most vehicles that were stolen from bases/units
are normally driven out of the unit/base just before weekend or after hours.
Some units/bases have recently tried to increase security by installing
surveillance cameras. But for every good system to be effective; there must
be a good management because the system cannot monitor itself.
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5.3 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH
This research serves to benefit the SANDF in preventing theft of military
vehicles and it also strives to help prevent the misuse of military vehicles by
military personnel. Students that will embark on a similar study in the future
will definitely find that this study adds value to their future research.
5.4 GENERAL FINDINGS
5.4.1 Proposal for further research
During research there are other aspects that do not fall within the scope of this
particular research. These aspects need to be researched further since they
contribute directly or indirectly to either theft or misuse of SANDF vehicles.
5.4.2 The SANDF drivers’ license system
The SANDF does not have a well monitored-license department as mentioned
earlier and as a result, licenses are issued without proper procedures. The
SANDF licenses are not user friendly and are hand written. These licences,
need to be benchmarked to the civilian licenses so that they can be smaller
(credit card size) and also have an expiry date. More-over, the military police
do not have a system that checks the validity of a member’s drivers’ license
and they are not the ones issuing drivers licenses in the SANDF.
5.4.3 The Log 14 Pamphlet
The log 14 pamphlet is a document that spells out the accepted procedure to
SANDF drivers but the problem is that the document is in Afrikaans instead of
English. This creates a problem for the majority of drivers who neither speak
nor understand the language (Afrikaans).
5.4.4 Parking of SANDF vehicles in the Pretoria CBD
There are several units that are situated in the Pretoria CBD and the problem
is that the only vehicles that are allowed to park on their premises are the
vehicles that belong to that particular unit and all other vehicles belonging to
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visitors are parked outside or along the street. This practice has created
opportunities for the theft of SANDF vehicles whilst parked outside
unguarded. Provost Marshal General (2007:7) explained that sometimes a
vehicle is parked along the road intentionally because the driver would be
involved as a third party in the theft of vehicles.
5.4.5 Violation of traffic offences by SANDF drivers
During the research it came to light that there is a growing tendency among
SANDF drivers to ignore or disobey traffic regulations on the road, such as
speeding. SANDF drivers are aware that there are not effective processes in
place to individualise a traffic violation fine to a driver and it is equally not easy
for the Traffic Department to send traffic fines to a unit/base. The Department
of Defence needs to find ways and means of dealing with these types of
tendencies by some drivers within the SANDF.
5.5 CONCLUSION
The SANDF has not invested much on general security aimed at ensuring the
safety of military bases and SANDF vehicles. Most of the measures that are in
place are passive instead rather than proactive. The Defence Headquarters in
Pretoria is supposed to be the most feared place in the country but for thieves
to target such a place and attempt or steal a vehicle, suggests that security is
not taken seriously in the SANDF. It also suggests that the current security
measures are ineffective.
The SANDF needs to improve the securing of both SANDF premises and
vehicles otherwise the organisation is going to suffer more losses in the near
future. It is not easy to track down a military vehicle if it does not have a
tracker mechanism installed because military vehicles do not have license
discs like civilian vehicles. On the other hand, it does not help to install
tracking devices on all SANDF vehicles if the system is not managed properly;
for the system to be effective it has to be monitored at all times.
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It also does not help to install a cheaper system simply because the
organisation wants to save money. It is better to have the best system that will
help the organisation to save more money in the future. It is always better to
prevent crime from happening rather than to let it happen and thereafter start
with lengthy investigation processes of tracking the vehicle and the
perpetrators. The organisation needs a proactive system that will help to
prevent the theft of SANDF vehicles before it happens. UNISA has been able
to save thousands of rands because the organisation uses a proactive system
that has made it difficult for thieves to steal their vehicles and it has also made
it difficult for their employees to misuse vehicles.
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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this study is to develop a strategy that can be used to
combat the theft of military vehicles not only in Gauteng but in South Africa
since the South African National Defence Force is a national asset although
the study concentrated in Gauteng. Therefore this chapter makes
recommendations for such a strategy, on the basis of the objectives and the
findings of this study. In conjunction with the objectives of the research, the
findings are summarised below:
Objective no. 1: To investigate the factors that give rise to motor-vehicle
thefts in the SANDF. The lack of security measures
within the military units/bases and the lack of motor
vehicles security measures aimed at monitoring military
vehicles have proven to be some of the contributing
factors to the theft of military vehicles in Gauteng.
Objective no. 2: To discuss various modus operandi used to steal motor-
vehicles within the SANDF. The most common modus
operandi identified was the use of a duplicate key or
master key to steal military vehicles.
Objective no. 3: To determine vehicles targeted by thieves in the SANDF.
The most targeted vehicles were the bakkies and the
buses (16 seater buses).
Objective no. 4: To investigate the role and responsibility of the Military
Police Division in curbing motor-vehicle theft in the
SANDF premises. The Military Police are not better
resourced to deal with the prevention of military vehicles
and there are not enough of them due to structural
challenges.
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Objective no. 5: To discuss preventative measures that could be used by
the SANDF to protect motor vehicles from being stolen.
Currently the SANDF does not have a system in place
which is aimed at preventing theft of motor vehicles,
therefore the researcher intended to develop a strategy
to prevent the theft of military vehicles.
Objective no. 6: To determine the amount of money that the SANDF has
lost as a result of motor-vehicles theft in Gauteng
Province alone. The SANDF has lost millions of rands
due to motor vehicles theft in Gauteng alone. The
researcher intended to find a solution to the problem so
that the SANDF could save some money.
Objective no. 7: To refine some of the existing methods and procedures is
currently used in curbing motor-vehicle theft within
SANDF. Some of the methods that are used within
SANDF units/bases are primitive; such the manual
registers that are used to register incoming and outgoing
vehicles, the guard system, and the stabling authority
system. These systems have proven to be ineffective.
The researcher intended to analyse other technological
methods that could help in solving the problem.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
After analysing some of the South African National Defence Force strategies
of combating the theft of SANDF vehicles, the researcher formulated the
following suggestions:
6.2.1 GPS tracking solutions biometric system
6.2.1.1 Biometric
The GPS Tracking Solutions Biometric System is a system that provides
complete control over fleet vehicles. It also allows for easy management of
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both the drivers and vehicles proactively rather than through the old standard
reactive methods.
According to Lessing and Wiesenberger (n.d.) biometrics refers to:
“technologies that measure and analyze human body characteristic, such as
fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns and hand
measurements for authentication purposes”. Research conducted by GPS
Tracking Solutions Biometric System showed that a fuel cost is determined by
the manner in which vehicles are driven. This is said to be the only vehicle
tracking company in South Africa that provides access to any vehicle using
the biometric verification system, this is done through fingerprint identification
and confirmation.
This is a system that will not only help by reducing theft of military vehicles but
will also help eradicate the misuse of vehicles through driver management
because commanders will know exactly who is driving a particular vehicle and
how is he or she driving that vehicle, as well as whether the driver incurred a
traffic fine. The biometric verification allows the person sitting behind the
monitor to identify who is driving a particular vehicle by simply identifying
employees by their fingerprints.
Before a motor vehicle can be switched on a driver will have to scan his or her
authorised driver’s index fingerprint using the scanner provided in the motor
vehicle; the scanned fingerprint will then be stored in a secured database
offsite. The fingerprint identification eliminates any requirement for vehicle
identification tags which sometimes prove unreliable in determining a
particular person who was driving a particular vehicle at any given time.
In case of the biometric verification, a vehicle’s engine cannot be switched on
if the biometric unit in a vehicle does not recognise or match any of the
fingerprints in the database. This system is versatile in the sense that it makes
it easier to register and deregister a driver, and changing drivers is quick and
easily managed. Moreover, it also allows registering of multiple drivers per
vehicle, which is especially useful for pool vehicles. Furthermore, the passive
vehicle identification tag only identifies the vehicle and not the driver and it
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makes it easier for anyone who is in possession of the tag to drive a vehicle
illegally or unauthorised.
This system does not automatically run on its own but for it to be effective, it
has to be strictly monitored and managed by a disciplined manual procedure
which will eventually cost management hours. Through this system SANDF
unit commanders will know the exact whereabouts of their drivers at all times
and this will ensure driver accountability. SANDF drivers like any other drivers
have to completely comply with the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic
Offences (AARTO) and by knowing and having accurate records;
commanders will be able to keep track of vehicles and driver transgressions.
6.2.1.2 Mobile tracker
The GPS Tracking Solutions does not only allow commanders to monitor
vehicles only when they are in their offices, but they also have the liberty to
monitor their vehicles anywhere and at any time through a small mobile
tracker field device. The GPS mobile device provides the user with the ability
to track vehicles live on the web IQ software. Moreover, the user can set up to
4 telephone numbers as well as a panic button on this very same device. It is
also regarded as a wonderful tool for security guards.
6.2.1.3 Real time reporting
The GPS Tracking Solutions proactively manages both SANDF vehicles and
drivers by automatically collating fleet-related data and violations and making
that information available to commanders. Service providers of this technology
have also developed an automated bureau service which proactively takes all
necessary actions on any individual or company’s behalf. In case of any
violation the system will immediately email a commander and simultaneously
send a Short Message Service (SMS) to the driver, sensitising him or her of
the infringement.
A driver is immediately made aware of any violation through the SMS and
email alerts and it also instills better driving habits since drivers will know that
they are monitored at all times. Commanders will also have access to first-
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hand information which will enable them to act immediately, swiftly and
proactively.
6.2.1.4 Speed capping and zone speed capping
Although the subject the researcher is investigating is about the prevention of
theft of SANDF official vehicles within the Gauteng province, the GPS
Tracking Solutions has a comprehensive system that will help to eradicate
speeding. Most accidents are attributed to speed and speed contributes to a
number of factors such as the performance and fuel consumption of vehicles,
it also leads to faster tyre erosion and engine deterioration resulting in higher
maintenance costs. All of these unnecessary costs can be easily avoided
when using GPS Tracking Solutions’ speed capping technology.
This system can cap the speed of any vehicle. If a vehicle that is fitted with the
speed capping technology exceeds the speed limit, a buzzer will sound,
warning the driver of his/her transgression. Should the driver ignore the
warning and accelerate, the speed capping technology will prevent further
acceleration and; the vehicle will slow down, returning to the allowed speed
limit, after which full power will again be available. It is a flexible system
because it allows the user to change the speed limit of any vehicle fitted with
the technology in real time.
This technology also allows the user to set an automatic speed reduction that
meets the speed limits applicable on any road. This implies that in 80 km/h
zones, the user’s vehicles will only travel at 80 km/h on that particular road.
The beauty of this technology is that a driver will not be able to exceed the
speed limit no matter how hard he tries. There are some exceptional cases
where a driver will have to rush to a particular location, sometimes it is
understandable, and that is why this solution allows for a remote activation,
deactivation, or amendment to a vehicle’s speed cap which can be done in 20
seconds.
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6.3 RECOVERY OF STOLEN VEHICLES
There is also a full stolen-vehicle recovery system which is provided by GPS
Tracking Solutions, this is a service that includes an assist button which
automatically transmits a request to a designated recipient when activated. In
the case of a hijacking, the required remedial action such as the remote
immobilisation of the vehicle and the initiation of the recovery process will be
activated.The recovery of stolen vehicles remains a challenge in the SANDF
(unless a vehicle is fitted with a tracking device). A suggestion with regard to
the recovery of vehicles after the tracking system has been installed is that the
Military Police Division should take over all the functions of controlling and
monitoring the vehicle tracking system on a full time basis. This will mean that
all four regions (Northern, Southern, Western and Central Military Police
Regions) of the Military Police Division in South Africa will have the tracking
system available in order to monitor all vehicles within their area of
responsibility.
Military Police reaction forces will have to be formed and trained so that their
main function will be the tracking and recovery of SANDF vehicles. The
reaction force will have to be provided with vehicles equipped with the latest
technology (similar to the vehicles that are used by the tracker companies)
that will enable them to be able to also monitor vehicles whilst on the move
and also enable those driving to communicate with the control room (duty
room) while on the move. GPS Tracking Solutions provides a comprehensive
solution to the current challenges faced by the SANDF with regard to vehicle
theft.
The Military Police has the capacity to track and recover any stolen SANDF
vehicle at any time since they operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
The least that DI can do is to provide intelligence information about syndicates
that target SANDF vehicles so that the Military Police can do the tracking and
recover those vehicles and subsequently do the necessary arrests of those
involved.
69
6.4 ADVANTAGES
The GPS Tracking Solution is a system that is able to monitor any type of
vehicle anywhere and at any time. Their technology can also be activated to
automatically transmit data to relevant commanders in the case of the
SANDF, in the event of harsh braking and it makes that information available
in a matter of seconds and ultimately reconstructs the events for you.
This system will definitely lead to the reduction of accidents and maintenance
costs because driving habits will also improve, leading to lower maintenance
especially in tyre replacement costs. Another advantage is that the real data
generated from the system can be used as proof or evidence in court and due
to its reliability; it can easily eliminate any doubts that may incur when relying
solely on eye witnesses. The fleet reporting software is proactive which
provides complete control over vehicles. There is also standardised fleet
management data which includes:- vehicle identification, driver identification,
departure times, time spent stopped, location or name of zone, trip distance,
driving time, average speed during a trip, maximum speed during a trip, virtual
odometer and idling time, stop information, street address and position co-
ordinates. These reports are always available on request.
The system has a capability to replay or review routes in case one needs to
know a route taken by a driver or in order to verify or maybe to plan a more
efficient route, this technology easily facilitates this. The system provides the
driver with valuable and accurate information and a confirmation of events
quickly. GPS Tracking Solutions has a capability to provide road side
assistance, although in the case of the SANDF it would not be necessary
because the SANDF has that capability anywhere in the country through the
Light Workshop Troops (LWT) personnel. It remains an advantage to other
organisations that do not have that capability.
The services that are provided by GPS Tracking Solutions are customised in
order to meet customer needs. Some of the SANDF vehicles were stolen
through hijackings and in some instances drivers became lost and therefore
rendered themselves and the vehicles as easy targets. GPS Solutions has the
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ability to connect with Garmin unit technology and by so doing a user is
granted an ability to schedule drivers in advance and ensure that they use the
most economic and safe routes. The system also makes it easier for both the
user and the driver to communicate to one another directly via the Garmin and
web IQ software. Should a driver experience a challenge on the road, instead
of talking to strangers; he/she will communicate directly with the user. This will
ensure that a driver is properly guided with detailed route alerts and thus
ensure productivity, effectiveness and efficiency.
In addition to the other advantages, this system will help the SANDF to save
on fuel costs through the real time access to virtual fuel gauge, litre-by-litre
allowing commanders to proactively manage counter-fuel-theft. The system
provides an option that can eliminate excessive idling and manage fuel
consumption per driver, even on pool vehicles.
6.5 DISADVANTAGES
This system depends on the availability of network coverage. If there are
network failures vehicles cannot be monitored. Another disadvantage is that
power failure affects the functioning of the static desktop monitors, so should
the person monitoring the system not have an alternative plan such as a
standby battery; vehicles will not be monitored.
6.6 COSTS
The installation cost of the GPS Tracking system is about R3000 per vehicle
(comprehensive system). The monthly cost is around R350 per month
depending on the type of a package deemed necessary.
6.7 DIGIT VEHICLE TRACKING FLEET MANAGEMENT
This is a system which is not similar to most vehicle tracking companies that
are web based. Vehicle trip data is stored on the local personal computer
(PC), all that one needs to do is to make a brief connection to the internet in
order to download the little strings of position information to the PC. Once
completed, route building and vehicle data are stored for immediate access.
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The viewing of the data and compiling of reports can be done completely
offline. This system cannot only save the SANDF time and frustrations but it
will also save 90 percent of data costs.
6.7.1 Highest quality of manufacture
Hardware is the heart of the tracking system. These is absolutely no use
buying a luxurious expensive vehicle and then risk damage to it by installing a
cheap, low quality electronic product which will be connected to a vehicle’s
wiring system. A team of engineers have designed technically one of the
strongest, most reliable, quality products so that the product’s safety can be
trusted by users in terms of its reliability.
6.7.2 User friendly software that works
The service provider’s software is designed to offer all services and has
adopted an easy-to-use button interface which guarantees easy access to all
the features. All the trip information can be viewed as a list of events in a
spread sheet format, a series of graphs representing speed and acceleration
or as a route on a map. Any report can be generated either using the custom
reporting function or by exporting the data to an excel spread sheet. Limitless
ability to add vehicle details, calculate fuel costs, log business mileage, track
driver activity and much more are all the features of the easy to use software.
6.7.3 Print reports
Any report or map view can be printed with the click of a button. More-over,
the system has the ability to keep a log of all business and private mileage
and reports can be modified to exclude private information like maximum
speed travelled.
6.7.4 Trip details
A right click on any trip offers more information and details of the trip including
acceleration and braking trends and all the speed samples. These can be
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sorted by clicking on the columns and trends of poor driving styles can be
shown and printed (Digit vehicle tracking brochure, 2013).
Figure 6.1: Custom fuel and trip details (Digit vehicle tracking fleet management brochure –
2013)
6.7.5 Verified live tracking
Knowing the whereabouts of the vehicles is paramount for the SANDF’s goal
of operational safety, efficiency and survival offering. While other systems only
represent the last known position, digit will constantly confirm how old the data
is, making sure that the data is viewed at real time position. During live
tracking, one can view multiple vehicles and be notified of them leaving or
entering predefined zones via the on screen alerts or email.
6.7.6 Vehicle details
All vehicle details can be loaded on the system, including make, models,
usual driver and start odometer. By adding the service interval one can
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monitor mileage and know when the vehicle is due for a service without even
going near it. This is a perfect tool for monitoring and managing vehicles
remotely.
6.7.7 Driver identification
Using the reliable Dallas tag i-button system one can identify who drove which
vehicle and when. During live tracking the current drivers’ picture will be
displayed on the monitor. Trip reports will also show who drove the vehicle on
any particular day so allocating traffic offences becomes possible. The Dallas
tag i-button has a unique number linked to a drivers’ profile.
6.7.7.1Advantages
All records of vehicles are safely and electronically stored in a data base,
making it easier for the user to view them at any time. It eliminates all
opportunities that may lead to the misuse of vehicle since a driver will know
that the vehicle is monitored at all times. Another advantage is that a vehicle’s
trip data is safely stored on a PC and therefore it requires few seconds to
download the little information on the internet because the system is not web
based. The user can make use of a mobile phone to track vehicles anywhere
and the system also gives an option of switching off the vehicle if it is
suspected to have been stolen but it is only done on instruction via the control
room. The system updates vehicles every 25 seconds when in motion. Up to
1000 vehicles can be tracked on one computer anywhere in South Africa.
More-over the user will also have the freedom to see drivers’ driving patterns
at any time.
6.7.7.2Disadvantages
During an interview with Mr Kenyon (24 May 2013) from Digit Company, he
explained that the system is not web-based but it requires limited internet
connections to download vehicle trip details, but the fact is that there must be
an internet connection for the system to be fully operational. In case there’s no
network coverage, the user is unable to download and update the vehicles’
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information on the PC. Another disadvantage is thatif the Dallas i-button tag is
stolen; it can be used by any driver since it does not prevent anyone from
driving a particular vehicle.
6.8 COSTS
The installation of the system costs R3000 per vehicle and the monthly
premium is R250 per vehicle according to Mr John Kenyon (interview on 24
May 2013).
6.9 THE IDECO ELECTRONIC VEHICLE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
(EVIM)
On 08 April 2013 the researcher visited the premises of Ideco Electronic
Vehicle Identity Management (EVIM) in Centurion to conduct an interview
about the EVIM access control system. At the gate the security guards no-
longer carry a register and a pen to register incoming and outgoing vehicles
but they only carry the EVIM unit. When the guards report for duty, each
guard takes his/her EVIM unit; logs his/her persal number or identity number
and the system identifies and confirms the guards’ particulars. EVIM units use
the latest biometric technology.
Figure 6.2: Evim Unit (Electronic vehicle identification management brochure - 2013)
When a visitor’s vehicle approaches the gate, the security guard scans the
vehicles’ license disc and then asks for the drivers’ identity number, cell phone
number and lastly the drivers’ fingerprint is scanned. If the driver has other
items with him/her such as laptop, desktop or any other electronic devices that
has bar-codes, the guard will also scan all those items. A few seconds after
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the registration and identification process, the driver receives an SMS which
will read: ‘Welcome to Centurion Office Park. Your EVIM Ref#: 3073156.
Enjoy the rest of the day’.
Ideco EVIM is a company that has decided to elevate the security and safety
of other companies by replacing the old paper-based visitor register by EVIM.
The unfortunate part is that the SANDF is resisting change since the old
register system is still in use countrywide. EVIM is a system that confirms a
visitor’s identity at the premises and securely registers the details
electronically. Instead of signing visitor’s register, EVIM replaces a signature
by capturing a driver’s fingerprint. The whole process of identification and
confirmation takes about the same time as completing a manual register. The
system has the capability of checking a drivers’ identity number on the
national database of identities. In the case of the SANDF, military personnel
can be checked using their force numbers and civilians can be checked
normally by using their identity numbers.
The confirmation captures on EVIM is made available only to authorise
members of that particular organisation visited, which implies that the
commander in charge of the guards in the case of the SANDF will be the only
person who has access to the information. All the visitors’ details cannot
under any circumstances be viewed by other visitors or the guards.
Essentially, the scanning or capturing of the fingerprint eliminates any
opportunities that could lead to identity thefts since the fingerprint replaces a
hand-written signature.
The best part about this system is that it prohibits illegal viewing of visitors’
details together with their signatures. The guard commander in charge will
have the liberty to view the visitors list at any time and everywhere, whether
on a desktop or on his/her mobile phone as long as he/she has an internet
connection. The visitors’ list can also be printed and in case of a dispute, it
can be presented in court as evidence.
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6.9.1 Advantages
Guards do not have to turn a blind eye on visitors because they do not have a
pen in their possession or because it is raining and they are afraid that the
register will get soaked. The EVIM system can be operated under any
weather conditions.
SANDF units/bases will have better control over both visitors’ vehicles and
SANDF vehicles. SANDF vehicles do not have license discs and to scan them
will mean micro-chips will have to be installed in all military vehicles, thus
making it easy to identify them. Any information captured by the EVIM unit can
be used in any court of law as evidence. The unit comes with a rechargeable
battery and a charger that can be kept in the guard room to be used at any
time. This system will not only help the SANDF with access control but it will
also help with the theft of computer equipment such as laptops and desktops
because any item that has a bar code can be scanned. There is also a
tendency of absenteeism on the part of unit guards (soldiers on guard duties,
especially on weekends), therefore the system will also help to alleviate the
problem because commanders will know through the EVIM system since a
guard will have to login when reporting on duty.
6.9.2 Disadvantages
The system does not have a disadvantage because even if there is no
network coverage, it can still scan vehicles and other equipment and as soon
as a network recovers, the system will automatically store the information and
securely registers all the drivers’ details electronically into the server. A
disadvantage might be an extended power failure.
6.10 COSTS
During an interview with Mr Paynter (Ideco EVIM Sales Executive) at
Centurion on 08 April 2013, he said that one unit cost around R30, 000 and if
a company or organisation does not have the capacity to purchase the unit,
the option of renting the unit it is also available. The monthly renting fee is
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about R2, 500 (inclusive) and after three years the unit will belong to the
company that rented it.
6.11 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the current situation suggests that SANDF is slowly but surely
losing the battle with regard to the theft of motor vehicles and a proactive
strategy aimed at preventing theft is surely needed. The SANDF also requires
a comprehensive system that will not only prevent theft of vehicles but also
prevent the misuse of vehicles, which in turn creates opportunities for vehicle
theft. Mattheus et al. (2001:3) mentioned that car thieves are doing their best
to be in line with technology and develops ways to outclass motor vehicles
security systems. Mattheus et al. (2001:3) further said that other syndicates
will go as far as legally purchasing a new model car for which there is a high
demand in the black market.
They would dismantle the car just to find and understand the specific
mechanical or electronic security devices to engineer ways to bypass that
system. In other words they dismantle the car just to study the security device
installed so that they could find ways and means to bypass that system in
order to steal similar cars to resell them. An additional security system is
always recommended instead of solely relying on the original factory security
systems. In order to combat theft of SANDF vehicles there has to be a direct
involvement of commanders on all levels to ensure that security of vehicles is
always given first priority.
The best technological systems that are available on the market can be
recommended for the SANDF but if there is poor management, the system will
never work. The commitment of commanders on all levels is important to the
success of any strategy that may be put in place. It is also important that
SANDF drivers should complete refresher courses on driving and
maintenance, as these courses will remind them of the importance of ensuring
that vehicles are always safe. Since the current Log 14 pamphlet is written in
Afrikaans and most African drivers do not understand the language, the
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outline of vehicle procedures and processes within the SANDF vehicles are a
concern. The refresher courses will serve to remind them about such issues.
Safety of SANDF vehicles starts at the military units/bases and if the access
control of SANDF personnel and visitors’ vehicles is not up to standard, no
vehicle security system put in place can be effective. Having guards at the
entrances does not necessarily mean that military units/bases are safe
because some of the guards were found be have been involved in motor
vehicle theft crime by providing information to thieves and also providing them
easy access to units/bases.
The SANDF needs to deal with theft of SANDF vehicles in a similar way to
how UNISA tackled a similar problem. Some of the systems that the
researcher has recommended for the SANDF will ease the burden from
SANDF drivers of writing point-to-point trips, since the systems will record
every trip at any time of the day or night. SANDF vehicles will always be
protected from theft and misuse. Ultimately, somebody needs to act fast,
otherwise the SANDF will continue to loose millions of rands incurred through
the theft of vehicles.
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